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Abstract: 
Peru is facing serious social and environmental water challenges. Experts and policy 
makers are trying to better understand the social and economic impacts of an increasing rate of 
glacial melt and a consequential prospect of water scarcity. Currently there is a great deal of 
strain put on the water resources originating from Andean glacial melt because these sustain 
most economic and social growth taking place at the coastal desert. At the same time, the 
country’s neoliberal development policies are changing the management of resources such as 
water.  The gradual expansion of extractive industries along with the growing influence of non-
state actors is introducing new discursive representations of the environment and facilitating 
important changes in the spatial, administrative, and political relations of governing nature. 
Among the most prominent changes are the recent restructuring efforts to the Peruvian 
institutional and legal structure for water governance. In this context, the forms of access, 
control, and exploitation of water in the Andes have become more contested than ever. This 
thesis explores the struggle for water at Parón, one of such Andean communities. This decade-
long struggle for water perfectly demonstrates how local groups, government agencies, and a 
private corporation negotiate their access to water. This thesis explores how organizational 
structures, institutional arrangements, and decision-making processes shape and are shaped by 
access, use, management, and regulation of water in a conflictive environment. Particularly, it 
analyzes how politics informs water management, and consequentially affects access to the 
resource. But also, given the uniqueness of this conflict, this thesis further incorporates a risk and 
vulnerability factor to its analysis. While this conflict comprises the socioeconomic, political, 
historical, cultural, and environmental components of most environmental struggles in Peru, it 
also presents very unique characteristics. The contested water source is managed not only for 
downstream water use, but also for glacial risk mitigation. As such, this thesis examines how 
 
 
 
water governance and vulnerability are co-produced in a conflictive environment. For this, I 
explore specific moments or instances – such as water flows and management, technology, 
institutions, discourses, and negotiations – that I recognize as embodying this relationship. In this 
analysis, I pay special attention to the impact of water technologies. I argue that a new, more 
convoluted, form of water politics – introduced to the watershed with hydropower technology – 
have created a new set of social relations that reinforce social vulnerability upon local water 
users, producing a transformation in vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: WATER GOVERNANCE, CONFLICT  
AND EQUITY IN PERU 
 
 
SEIZING PARÓN  
Pedro1 travelled from Huaráz to Piura because he worried about his community’s future. 
For almost two decades now, his people had been deprived of their water rights2 (Defensoría del 
Pueblo, 2009). As the community’s president, he worried that there was nothing he could do to 
change Cruz de Mayo’s grim future. Ever since colonial times, campesinos3 had been treated as 
second class citizens in Peru (Vera Delgado & Zwarteveen, 2008).  This time it was no different. 
It was 2008 and it had been already twelve years since the government granted Lake Parón’s 
water management to a private entity (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). The lake was the 
community’s primary water source, and their claims to water rights were still unanswered. The 
community’s irregular access to water was placing a serious strain on irrigators. It was near 
impossible to coordinate water use. This situation was generating internal conflicts, weakening 
the community’s social ties, and diminishing the local crop yields - an urgent problem since Cruz 
de Mayo’s population lives off of subsistence farming.  
“As a dirigente (leader)” Pedro told me in one of our conversations “I didn’t know what 
to do anymore!” So he embarked on a day-long journey to attend the workshop on water that the 
Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social or Episcopal Commission for Social Action (CEAS), was 
                         
1 With the exception of public officials, all names used in this thesis are fictional. 
2 I borrow from Boelens to conceptualize water rights. Thus, in my analysis I understand water rights as “authorized demands to 
use (part of) a flow of water, including certain privileges, restrictions, obligations, and sanctions accompanying this 
authorization, among which a key element is the power to take part in collective decision-making about system management and 
direction” (2002, p.3). 
3 Term used to refer to the indigenous group of people who speaks Quechua and who is a smallholder farmer whose identity is 
directly linked with his key subsistence activity (agriculture), and with the economic domination by a relatively powerful external 
group (Boelens et al, 2006). 
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hosting for the diocese.4 As a catechist and as an indigenous community leader, Pedro had been 
invited to participate in this event, Agua, Cultura y Gestión, or water, culture, and management. 
Maria, an anthropologist working closely with the Cruz de Mayo community, explained to me 
that water, culture, and management were becoming contentious topics in Peru. At the time, the 
government was in the process of passing a bill that introduced a new water governance 
arrangement. The opposition feared it would favor private interests. In fact, the workshop’s 
intention was to inform its participants of how this new arrangement could affect their access to 
water. Participants also discussed the Cochabamba case to reflect on how others had reacted to 
the government’s attempts to favor the private sector.5 
At the workshop, Pedro had learned that glaciers were receding, that their sole water 
supply was bound to diminish, and that their water rights were about to change. “After the 
workshop” Pedro told me “I realized the water problem in Parón was more complex than I 
imagined…” Having heard the case of neighboring Bolivia gave him hope though. “I realized” 
he said “I had to do something to change the situation!” 
As Manuel sipped his coffee, he reflected on how to begin telling me where the Parón 
conflict began. It was a cool winter night in Caráz. Kids were running around the plaza and their 
mothers were chatting distractedly. I wondered how this town, as small as it is, remained so 
vibrant on a winter night. But Caráz is known in the region for having clima templado or 
temperate climate. As climate is so favorable in this area, conditions are ideal for agriculture and 
that was clearly manifested in the landscape. In the two hour journey from Huaráz to Caráz, 
crops changed as fast as altitude decreased (Figure 1). The landscape went from being dominated 
by choclo, or corn, at 3,000 meters above sea level (m.a.s.l) in Huaráz, to flowers, peaches and 
                         
4 CEAS is the religious institution that has been most involved with Cruz de Mayo in helping them organize their position for the 
negotiations on the management of waters of Lake Parón. 
5 Refers to the water wars in Cochabamba, Bolivia, where a strong social movement was able to prevent the privatization of the 
municipal water supply’s management (Perreault, 2005). 
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artichokes at 2,200 m.a.s.l in Caráz. Just as in Cruz de Mayo, most Caracinos’6 livelihood is 
mainly dependent on agriculture.  
“There were only two possible outcomes: we either save Parón and strengthen the 
community as we are already doing, or…I go to jail!” Manuel’s narrative was strong and vivid.  
“When I became the leader of the Michi Rumi7 irrigators committee, I realized the water problem 
in La Campiña8 was larger than simple internal irrigators’ mismanagements. The real problem 
was in Lake Parón. According to law, users should manage the water located in their 
jurisdictions. Then, why were the waters of Lake Parón being managed by a private company?”   
Judging from interviews and later events, it appeared that Manuel was not the only one 
questioning Parón’s water governance. Why had their access to water changed so drastically 
since Duke Energy began managing Lake Parón’s waters? Was this just? Was this legal? After 
years of having no results from repeatedly complaining to the government, water-users started 
growing tired. “I met with Pedro and other representatives from Cruz de Mayo, Caráz, and 
Campiña several times to discuss our discontent with Duke Energy’s water management 
practices” said Manuel “We were determined to remediate this situation and to decide on a 
strategy to make our voices heard.” As he narrated his story he grew more and more excited. 
“Señores!” he said while appearing to become angry “since the authorities are just Duke 
Energy’s puppets and we don’t receive the attention we deserve, we should take control of 
Parón’s waters!”  
“It was July 27th, 2008 and no decision was made!” Manuel cried “I was determined to 
rush the verdict…” he looked at me intensely for a moment before he began reenacting the days 
                         
6 Term used to refer to those who are from Caráz. 
7 Michi Rumi, or Mishirumi, with over nine kilometers long, is the longest canal in the area, which according to the latest water 
management report conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture provides water to 1,200 users.   
8 PL residents refer to the area that surrounds Caráz as La Campiña. This area is mainly composed of agricultural fields. Most 
farmers in this area grown crops for local and national commerce. For more information refer to stakeholder analysis section in 
Chapter Three.  
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that gave him fame “Amigos” he narrated passionately “tomorrow is the 28th and it might be the 
last time I can celebrate a holiday9… If death awaits on the 29th, I will be satisfied!” And he 
continued ‘With or without you, I will seize the lake on the 29th!’  
It was 2:00 a.m. on 
the 29th and Manuel’s alarm 
went off. He began packing 
his bag with “everything!” 
as he described it: “pills, 
snacks, water, first aid 
supplies…” So he got on 
his motorcycle and left for 
the meeting point. It was a 
three hour ride up the 
mountain (see Figure 2). 
“As I rode on the winding 
road, my mind was racing!” 
he told me excitedly “I 
wondered about many 
different things: if there 
would be anyone waiting for 
me, how would they go about occupying the lake? or if this would be my last day alive...”  
At 4,200 meters above sea level, glacial lake Parón provides drinking water for 
approximately 25,000 people in the town of Caráz and the surrounding agricultural area of 
                         
9 July 28th is the Peruvian Independence day. 
Figure 1: Topographic map of Ancash. Note: altitudes are depicted in meters 
Source: Altamirano, 2012. 
Study Area 
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Campiña (INEI, 2009b), almost 600 people in the campesino community Cruz de Mayo, as well 
as irrigation water for small, medium, and large scale farmers. These waters then feed into the 
Santa River, and are used for hydroelectric generation at Cañón del Pato, or Huallanca (see 
Figure 2). During the mid 1990s the government authorized Egenor, a Duke Energy subsidiary, 
to manage the Cañón del Pato hydroelectric plant. As part of the negotiation Duke was entitled to 
use water from Parón (field notes, 2010). The use of Parón waters for electricity generation has 
been challenging for downstream user groups since Egenor’s water releases reduced the supply 
for the town of Caráz and was incompatible with the irrigation needs of the local communities 
(Peralta, 2010).   
It is precisely the opposing needs and uses of water among different user groups in the 
Parón-Llullán watershed (PL), along with the oppression that Duke’s water use implied for local 
user groups, that initiated the Parón water conflict. At the heart of this conflict is not only water 
governance, but also vulnerability. As a population that mostly depends on agriculture, PL 
residents were socially made vulnerable by the lack of reliable access to water.10 However, their 
vulnerability is not only socially induced, it is also environmentally induced. The Cordillera 
Blanca is a disaster-prone area.11 In addition to being susceptible to earthquakes, because of the 
instability of its surrounding glacial lakes, is highly vulnerable to glacial lake outburst floods12 
(GLOF). Hence, the management of Lake Parón waters is crucial to the production of 
vulnerability. As this thesis discusses, this conflict, and the lake’s water governance 
                         
10 In this thesis, I conceptualize access as the ability of a community to benefit from a resource. This is a dynamic term that 
depends on specific social and environmental processes. Borrowing from Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) framework, I view access as 
generating from a series of means, processes, and relations within society that are simultaneously shaped by structural and 
relational processes such as technology, capital, social relations, markets, labor, knowledge, authority, and identities. 
Furthermore, much like Langridge et al. (2006), I recognize that ‘opportunities for access are [also] facilitated…by the 
geographic location, climate of a region and the ecological integrity of the resource base’ (p. 155).   
11 Cordillera Blanca is a mountain range in Peru that encompasses 260 glaciers. Parón is one of many lakes that have formed in 
this area as a result of melting glaciers (Portocarrero, 1995). Lake Parón’s geography is further explained in Chapter Two.  
12 A glacial lake outburst flood is a high-magnitude flood that occurs when the pressure of the lake’s water or the collapse of 
glacial ice cause the dam containing a glacial lake to fail (Bradley et al, 2009; Carey, 2010).  
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arrangement, shapes and is shaped by vulnerability.   
  
Figure 2: Research area. The most important areas for my research were (1) Lake Parón; (2) Cruz de Mayo; (3) Campiña; (4) Caráz; (5) 
Huallanca (Location for Cañón del Pato, and Duke Energy). Note: This map illustrates only the general position of boundaries.  
 
WATER VULNERABILITY: A NEW VULNERABILITY LANDSCAPE, CHANGING GOVERNANCE 
ARRANGEMENTS, THE MEANING OF PARÓN’S SEIZING, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Having the largest concentration of glaciers in the country, inhabitants of towns adjacent 
to the Cordillera Blanca, especially those along the rivers that descend from the glaciers, face a 
serious risk of outburst floods (Chuquisengo & Ferradas, 2007). Experts have qualified this 
region as one that clusters the largest number of risks in the whole nation (Portocarrero et al., 
2008). To make matters worse, during the past s7666666everal decades, an increasing rate of 
glacier melt has led to “a massive increase in the number of … glacial lakes: from 223 in 1950, 
to 314 in 1983, to 347 in 1997” (Carey, 2008, p. 185), a trend that further increases the risk of 
outburst floods in the area.  
As a disaster-prone area, Cordillera Blanca has been witness to several outburst floods 
HUALLANCA 
CARAZ 
CAMPINA 
CRUZ DE MAYO 
LAKE 
PARON 
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that have claimed a number of lives. Just to name a few, in 1941 a GLOF in Huaráz, the capital 
city of Ancash department, killed approximately 5,000 people; In 1945 another flood claimed 
five hundred lives in Chavín; In 1950, the Cañón del Pato hydroelectric plant was completely 
destroyed by torrential waters from a glacial flood; And in 1970, 15,000 people were killed by 
another disaster in nearby Yungay (Carey, 2008). To prevent these types of incidents, in the 
1940s the Peruvian government began a series of glacial studies that led to “lake security 
projects”. These projects represented a significant shift in the government’s approach on the 
disaster prevention agenda. Rather than mitigating risks through hazard zoning, government 
experts began draining and damming glacial lakes. By the 1960s more than 40 glacial lakes had 
been contained (Portocarrero C., 1995). These efforts, at the same time, were believed to provide 
a unique opportunity to use water for development. As early as the 1940s, experts believed that 
disaster prevention could be combined with hydroelectric generation. With time, hydroelectric 
and irrigation interests have become more and more influential on the Cordillera Blanca’s 
disaster management agenda  (Carey, 2008). Even though this particular approach went largely 
unquestioned in Peru (except for a few scholars, see Carey et al., 2012; Lynch, 2012), combining 
disaster management with hydroelectric generation has transformed, and even intensified, the 
vulnerability that local residents and water users experience. Siding with this point of view, I 
argue that, since then, vulnerability became mainly driven by social factors - particularly, the 
lack of secure access to water - rather than the risk of exposure to a natural disaster.  
Social scientists studying vulnerability in the Cordillera Blanca area associate it with 
watershed governance. In particular, they relate it to the ways in which the interests of 
communities, their livelihoods and ecosystems, are represented in the allocation and 
management of water (Bury et al., 2011; Lynch, 2012). The seizing of lake Parón was a clear 
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response to a perceived direct threat to people’s livelihoods. Scholars often times connect the 
threat to rural livelihoods in Peru to development efforts (Bebbington & Bebbington, 2011; 
Grompone, 2009; Vera Delgado & Zwarteveen, 2008). The conflict in Parón unfolds in a context 
of historical grievance against centralized economic and political interests. For PL residents, the 
very water management regime that ‘secured’ them from the risk of outburst floods began 
appearing a gimmick that only sacrificed their access to water to secure the hydroelectric plant’s 
use.  
Today, the vulnerability experienced by PL residents and water users is transforming 
constantly because the management of Parón’s waters has become heavily politicized. As water 
users begin to face the responsibilities included with the management of the lake, and as they 
attempt to negotiate a water governance plan, the risk of GLOF they are exposed to and the 
prospects for a secure access to water are constantly changing. Pointing to the politics and 
struggle for access to the resource this thesis explores the conflict in Parón. In addition to 
examining the historically contingent development of its water governance, this thesis explores 
the unique ways in which water governance arrangements shape and are shaped by both access 
to water and the risk of GLOF. In particular it asks, in what ways do water governance and 
vulnerability co-produce each other?  
METHODOLOGY 
Fieldwork for this thesis consisted of two consecutive summers in Peru. Trying to prepare 
to research the social effects of climate change in the Cordillera Blanca area – my intended topic 
of research - I read as many publications as I could prior to arriving to the country on my first 
visit (Bury et al., 2011; Portocarrero, 1995; Urrutia & Vuille; 2009; Young & Lipton; 2006). I 
also spent some time online searching for institutions that worked on topics related to climate 
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change in Andean Peru. I compiled a list of organizations that I wanted to reach out to. Ideally, I 
would connect with governmental, non-profit and research organizations. With a list in hand, and 
a clear idea of what I was looking for, I reached out to acquaintances to get connected to 
employees from these organizations. At times, this strategy worked, and I was introduced via 
email to people I interviewed once in Peru. I also contacted professionals I had not previously 
met; however, I never heard back from anyone whom I was not referred to by an acquaintance. 
On my first visit, during the summer of 2010, I spent three weeks in Lima connecting 
with non-profits, research institutes with projects in Huaráz, and government agencies. Having 
already established a couple of connections before arriving allowed me to start my field work on 
a positive note. Except for once, the interviews I was able to schedule were limited to those 
institutions where I got introduced by acquaintances. I met with a lawyer from the Autoridad 
Nacional del Agua, or National Water Authority (ANA),13 and a private practice lawyer 
specializing in water. My aim was to understand the 2009 Ley de Recursos Hídricos or Water 
Resources Law.14 To become familiar with critical understandings of the law I approached the 
Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales or Peruvian Center for Social Studies (CEPES). Even 
though I was unable to connect with a water rights specialist, I interviewed an anthropologist to 
better comprehend natural resource use and distribution. I also interviewed an independent 
researcher who studies climate change in the Andes. He introduced me to the climate change 
debate in Peru, and directed me to scientists in Huaráz that ended up being central for my 
research. Even though not all interviews I conducted were directly related with my initial topic or 
area of research, I found them to be useful because through them I was able to re-direct and 
                         
13 The National Water Authority is the governmental institution in charge of design and implementation of water policies, as well 
as enforcement of regulations for water use and distribution (Autoridad Nacional del Agua, 2009a). For more information on this 
institutions refer to stakeholder analysis section in Chapter Three. 
14 The Water Resources Law passed in 2009, its regulation passed in 2010. Today, it is only beginning to be implemented 
throughout the country. For more detail see Chapter Two.   
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focus my research topic to what it is today.  
In addition to interviews, I spent my time in Lima gathering documents from social and 
environmental research institutes. I visited the libraries of the Sociedad Peruana de Derecho 
Ambiental, or Peruvian Society of Environmental Rights (SPDA), Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos, or Peruvian Studies Institute (IEP), and CEPES. Being aware that my topic of 
research would probably change, I downloaded and photocopied anything I found in relation to 
climate change and livelihoods in the Andes (i.e. critiques and evaluations of legislation and 
policies, reports on development projects for adaptation, reports on agriculture and the use of 
water in the Andes).   
I spent the remainder of my summer in the department of Ancash, more specifically, in 
the cities of Huaráz and Caráz. Thanks to the help of personnel at Parque Nacional de Hascarán 
or Huascaran National Park (PNH),15 I was promptly able to pinpoint my research area to the PL 
watershed - which includes the communities of Caráz, Campiña, and Cruz de Mayo – and to 
identify and contact the organizations I needed to talk to. I conducted interviews with key 
decision makers from different public and non-profit entities including Administración Local del 
Agua, or Local Water Administration (ALA); Glaciología; Comisión Diocesana de Servicio 
Pastoral Social, or Diocesan Commission of Pastoral Social Service (CODISPAS); the Regional 
Government of Ancash; Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil or National Institute of Civil 
Defense (INDECI); And the Municipality of Caráz.16 My aim with these interviews was to 
uncover the local perception on the effects of climate change, and to unpack discourses regarding 
the use of and access to waters from lake Parón; However, all interviews would end up in a 
discussion about the conflict over lake Parón’s water governance. Stakeholders I interviewed 
                         
15 PNH is located within the Cordillera Blanca and its mission is to protect all glaciers and biodiversity (UNESCO, 2007). Lake 
Parón is located within the park’s territory. For more information on PNH refer to stakeholder analysis section on Chapter Three. 
16 For information on these organizations refer to stakeholder analysis section on Chapter Three. 
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seemed more anxious to talk about the conflict and governance issues than about climate change.  
In the end, I found myself researching and asking more questions about the conflict itself rather 
than climate change. This was a clear signal that I had found a new research interest. So when I 
went back to the field in July 2011, I had a new topic, water governance. 
During my second year of fieldwork, 2011, I was in Peru for six weeks. This time, unlike 
the previous year, I spent most of my days in Huaráz and Caráz. Reflecting on my first year of 
research, I realized that my time would have been better spent if I had visited Ancash first. My 
idea was that after uncovering the specific details about the conflict in Ancash, I would be better 
able to identify how the conflict connects with conversations about water rights in Lima. Since I 
already knew the conflict, in addition to trying to understand the ways in which it had evolved, I 
wanted to examine the channels and effectiveness of communication between government 
institutions, the irrigators’ governance arrangements and the ways in which they organize water 
distribution, and the flaws in the implementation of the 2009 Water Resources Law. Particularly 
I wanted to understand how integrated water resources management (IWRM) looks like on the 
ground.  
Once in Ancash, in addition to re-connecting with interviewees from my previous visit, I 
was able to meet with a few additional people. I arranged two interviews with representatives 
from Duke Energy. I was also able to connect with the president of Cruz de Mayo and a 
comunero.17 Unlike my previous visit, in addition to interviewing decision makers, I also talked 
to irrigators and residents. The information gathered from these interviews was eye opening to 
me, because I heard a completely different narrative of the conflict. In Lima, my fieldwork was 
quite different from the previous year. Rather than researching the 2009 water law, I was 
                         
17 In the area, locals refer to those who live in communal land as comuneros. In this case, the term refers to a Cruz de Mayo 
resident. 
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determined to understand social conflicts in Peru and the role of the government in these. With a 
completely different set of questions, I visited ANA again. I also interviewed a private consultant 
specializing on social conflicts, and a social scientist from IEP. 
Going to the field on two separate occasions proved quite advantageous because I was 
able to see and live the progression of the conflict. With this opportunity, I was able to 
understand how dynamic conflicts are, and how the roles and importance of stakeholders 
transform as time passes. In addition, I was able to acknowledge how inter-personal/inter-group 
dynamics, discourses, and interests shifted as the conflict progressed. Reflecting on and 
comparing my field notes from my first and second visit, and acknowledging that the conflict 
changed tremendously, I would argue that my narrative, and view of the conflict, would have 
been different if I had visited the field on only one occasion. It appears to me that on the course 
of the year between my first and second visits the conflict escalated dramatically and the 
stakeholder’s willingness to solve anything waned. While during my first visit I noticed different 
user groups vigorously defending their positions and trying to find an outcome, during my 
second visit all groups seemed tired and frustrated. They had stopped communicating, and 
appeared to feel animosity towards each other.  
Being Peruvian was of great advantage to me while doing research, because as Sultana 
argues, ‘conducting international fieldwork involves being attentive to histories of colonialism, 
development, globalization and local realities’ (Sultana, 2007, p. 375). Even though I had never 
been in the area before doing fieldwork, I already was familiar with the culture, history, and 
social dynamics in smaller Peruvian Andean towns. I was also aware of the tacit norms of how to 
interact with interviewees (public officials and indigenous leaders). In addition, the network I 
already had from my hometown proved useful in finding contacts and maybe even determining 
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their willingness to help me. Before even arriving to Huaráz, I already had my lodging sorted out 
and some interviews scheduled.  
Through these connections at home I met personnel at PNH. This institution was 
incredibly helpful during my time in Ancash. They facilitated my research, and through them I 
became familiar with the area. I learned about different indigenous communities, their 
livelihoods, and the challenges they face in interacting with other social actors and with the 
environment. As I preferred to study an agricultural community, I narrowed my study area to the 
PL watershed. PNH also granted me a space to work, informed me of relevant events, and 
provided me with transportation to these events when possible. In addition, and most important, 
through PNH I was also able to connect with key actors and decision makers in the area.  
All in all, I conducted 21 interviews in 2010 and 20 in 2011. Of all these, I was able to 
record all but three of these interviews. Even though I also took notes during the interviews, most 
data I used were transcriptions either from interviews or impressions I recorded after the 
interview itself. While in some occasions I transcribed the interviews only a few hours after these 
happened, other times, due to lack of time or energy, I did this work once in Syracuse. While 
transcribing, I added my thoughts and comments with a different pen color.18 Once I finished 
transcribing, I used open coding to identify different key themes for my writing (Emerson et al., 
1995). Even though while writing this thesis, my research question shifted several times, my 
overall interests remained. Thus, I revisited my transcripts more than once, but I did not re-do the 
coding.  
ETHICS AND OBSTACLES OF FIELDWORK 
My second visit to the field was significantly more productive than my first one. In 
addition to spending my time more efficiently, thanks to my previous experience in the field, I 
                         
18 Later on, these comments were incredibly helpful for developing arguments in my writing. 
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was better able to find the information I was searching for from my encounters with the locals. In 
addition, while transcribing during my first year I realized how, in order to conduct successful 
interviews, I needed to better distinguish when to conduct myself in a professional manner, and 
when to be more informal. In general, this depended on my perception of the interviewee’s 
openness to build rapport. The vocabulary I used, the way I expressed myself, and how I 
interacted with interviewees changed accordingly. Particularly, I had difficulty conducting 
formal interviews with public servants because I sensed I was engaging in an unequal ‘power 
dynamic’ and that I was at a disadvantage. I learned to better deal with this challenge only once I 
validated myself as a researcher who is able to produce knowledge. Being equipped with self-
confidence put me in a better position to face the ‘power dynamics’ that one encounters as a 
researcher in the field (Katz, 1994).  
My perception of these power dynamics was shaped by my upbringing in a Peruvian 
society that I identify as strongly marked by gender and race inequality. Being that I grew up in 
Peru, I faced more than one interesting challenge during fieldwork. Similarly to other 
geographers, I struggled to find a distinction between ‘home’ and ‘field’ (Mullings, 1999; 
Sultana, 2007). Even though the field site was not located close to my home, and my upbringing 
took place in different socio-economical context (an urban city rather than a rural town), research 
participants and I had many common grounds. We had been affected by similar historical and 
political processes. As such, during fieldwork, I was constantly negotiating and changing my 
position. At times, I was an insider, others, I was an outsider, yet others, I was both (Mullings, 
1999). As Sultana explains, “The ambivalences, discomfort, tensions and instabilities of 
subjective positions became important to be reflexive about and work through, where the 
contradictions in my positionality and in-between status had to be constantly reworked as I 
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undertook fieldwork” (2007, p.377). As such, the information I gathered and the findings I 
arrived to in this thesis are shaped by these dilemmas. 
Even though I was aware of the differences and hierarchies in the field, I found it very 
difficult to accept and work with them. For instance, recognizing the power deriving from my 
educational background, and my language skills, I tried to hide it whenever possible. Even 
though it was probably implied that I spoke English when I introduced the university I was 
coming from, many times, I purposefully introduced the university by its name in Spanish 
hoping that it would be understood as a University in Peru. I was afraid that these privileges 
would place me in certain categories (such as a gringa19), or much worse, position me with ties 
to Duke Energy, the ‘gringo’ organization that many claim is has been using all the water. In my 
view, these connections would obstruct my entry to the local communities and diminish all 
possibilities to build rapport with the research participants.   
In fact, I had difficulty building rapport with the indigenous representatives. During the 
summer of 2010, Pedro, Cruz de Mayo’s president, did not trust me and stood me up 
continuously. Even though I tried to meet up with him several times, we never got together. My 
initial guess was that since at the time there was so much attention and effort put into the 
conflict, many residents were paranoid and saw all outsiders, especially ‘gringos’, as possible 
‘spies’ from Duke Energy.20 However, after reflecting on it, I realized that there could have been 
many reasons for this rejection. Talking to an outsider like me could possibly spark all sorts of 
rumors questioning his legitimacy as a leader. Also, it could have been that he was just too busy 
dealing with paperwork, trainings, meetings, and other commitments that were required of him to 
represent his people in the conflict.  
                         
19 Gringo(a) is the word commonly used in Peru to denote white foreigners, commonly from the United States. 
20 On a few occasions, during interviews and interactions with PL residents, I heard people accusing other residents 
of being Duke Energy’s spies.  
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My suspicions of the disadvantages of my educational background and language skills 
were proven wrong during my second year in Caráz. Ironically, I overcame this trust barrier with 
Pedro through my language skills. Pedro was fascinated and curious about English. He wanted 
me to teach him English. Unfortunately, this breakthrough happened towards the end of my stay 
so our interactions were few. I was able to gain insight to Cruz de Mayo’s governance structure, 
land tenure, and water management systems. In addition, I learned about their perceptions on the 
conflict. However, this was from the leader’s perspective. I wish I would have had the time to 
talk to water users in Cruz de Mayo to compare their narrative to the one given by leaders. This 
insight could have helped me identify additional factors shaping the vulnerability produced from 
the lake’s seizing.  In the case of Campiña it was surprising to me to find such a stark disconnect 
between decision makers’ and irrigators’ narratives.  
Regardless of how difficult I found these obstacles to be, these do not compare to the 
ethical challenge I face up to this day. Having talked with almost all stakeholders, and having 
been perceived as a neutral person, I believe I posses more information on this conflict than 
anyone in the area does. Reflecting on Cahill’s (2009) writings on participatory research, in 
which she frames research ethics as a “stance against neutrality” (p.50) and as “an existential 
commitment to an ethical ideal rather than to historical inevitability” (Aronowitz, 2001, p. 7 in 
Cahill, 2009), I find myself in a conundrum. On the one hand, my adherence to the University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) codes of human subject panels, and prior promises of 
confidentiality and ethical commitments with each of my interviewees keep me from sharing any 
of the collected information. On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by Bishop Desmond Tutu 
(as cited in Cahill, 2007, p. 49) “If you are neutral in a situation of injustice, you have chosen the 
side of the oppressor.”  
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I chose to remain neutral; however, to me, this has been an incredibly difficult decision, 
not only because I had to suppress my own opinion during fieldwork, but also because of the 
impact I could, but did not, have on this conflict. I believe that if done carefully, I could use the 
information I collected, along with the conflict management skills I learned while in graduate 
school to contribute to the de-escalation of this disagreement.21 Until August 2011, which is 
when I left the field, the Parón conflict was frozen. Stakeholders were stuck in their positions and 
negotiations were suspended. According to Kriesberg and Dayton “Once a conflict has persisted 
or has become severe, the adversaries tend to become locked into the positions they have 
previously staked out… Mediators often help reframe the struggle” (2011, p. 9). In addition, Aall 
argues that “the power in mediation lies in part on the mediator’s ability to be an agent of 
communication, to bring the parties information that they need” (2007). I am not suggesting that 
I could be a mediator to this conflict. Instead, my dilemma lies on the ability I have to de-
escalate this conflict by communicating my knowledge to the different water user groups. As 
such, with my research experience, I have found myself “negotiating ethics” and learning about 
the contradictions between ‘institutional ethics’ and ‘ethical practice’ (Cahill et al., 2007).  
In this light, I would like to point out my own biases to the reader. As I try to remain 
objective, I acknowledge that my arguments and the information I acquired while in the field are 
not neutral. As Rose (1997) argues, the knowledge made depends on who its makers are. As 
pointed out before, power relations between myself and my interviewees have affected the 
knowledge that I collected.  In addition, my ‘position and agency’ (Katz, 1992) while conducting 
interviews was strongly influenced by my past experiences and personal opinions on the topics 
                         
21 In his book, Tidwell argues “The manner in which you interpret the value of conflict will have a great impact on the way you 
study conflict but will also influence the way in which you may or may not seek to resolve it” (2001, p.36). For my research, I 
viewed conflict as intimately tied to justice. While disagreements normally emerge from an injustice, these serve to achieve 
social change, and result in either reinforcing or further undermining. However, I also recognize the importance that individual 
perceptions play in the emergence and transformation of a conflict. Hence, in my analysis, (1) I place emphasis on the different 
party’s perceptions, interests, and positions; and (2) I implicitly assume that a mediator is able to de-escalate the conflict. 
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discussed.  
I believe that the information I gathered from interviews is strongly shaped by who I am, 
how my interviewees perceived me, and the way in which I was introduced to them. Some 
research participants exerted authority. As a young female who is just beginning her career, I felt 
that on a few occasions public officials failed to take me as seriously as I would have liked. For 
instance, many times, during scheduled interviews, I was stood up, or after waiting for long 
periods of time, granted just a few minutes for a continuously interrupted interview. Also, on 
several occasions, I was promised information that I never received.  
As some participants exerted authority, others were subservient. For example, I 
connected with personnel at PNH, private lawyers, and consultants in Lima through networks I 
established while living in Peru. As I understand, those that helped me connect with these 
interviewees, are powerful individuals that had a strong relationship with my interviewees. 
Hence, interviewees went out of their way to ensure I left the interview more than satisfied, 
connecting me with others and giving me more information than I would have acquired 
otherwise.  
While I acknowledge that my identity shaped these advantages and inconveniences, I am 
aware that they could have been also affected by the ‘circumstances’ in which knowledge was 
produced (Rose, 1997). As such, I recognize that “The knowledges produced… are within the 
context of our intersubjectivities and the places we occupy at that moment (physically and 
spatially as well as socially, politically, and institutionally). Knowledge is always partial and 
representations of knowledges produced through field research embody power relations that the 
researcher must be aware of in undertaking ethical research.” (Sultana, 2007, p. 382)  
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STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
To answer my research question, I consider it appropriate to structure this thesis into five 
chapters. While I address the research questions more directly in the conflict and vulnerability 
chapters, I begin by situating this discussion in the historical, economic, and cultural settings of 
Peru, and particularly, of Ancash and Caráz. Thus, following this first introductory chapter, 
Chapter Two introduces the reader to the contextual setting for the subsequent analysis. In the 
first section, I illustrate the gravity of Peru’s water stress problem. Most urban centers are 
located in the arid coastal region and rely on water flowing down from the Andes (Gonzales, J, 
2011). In addition, the booming industries of agriculture for export and mining also require 
heavy volumes of water (Painter, 2007). Subsequently, I analyze the Peruvian water legislation. 
First, I situate the 2009 Water Resources Law historically. In this section, I show how, as a 
response to changing water demands and threats, the Peruvian Government drastically changed 
the national structure for water governance. Second, I provide a brief critical analysis of the 
design and current implementation of the law. Particularly, I emphasize the ways in which this 
legislation is failing to provide sustainable or equitable results. In the following section, 
narrowing down analysis to the regional and local scales, I review the social and environmental 
trends in the research area. I briefly assess the socioeconomic tendencies in Ancash, and provide 
a deeper analysis on trends of water demand vis-à-vis water supply. Particularly, I compare how 
local livelihoods, and water needs and management practices, compare to water supply 
tendencies. As de-glaciation is affecting water availability in the Cordillera Blanca in the central 
Andes (Vuille et al., 2008), this potential water scarcity and conflicting uses pose critical risks to 
those communities that depend heavily on water for their livelihoods (Young & Lipton, 2006). In 
brief, by introducing the country’s water challenges and giving an overview of the local social 
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and natural landscapes, my aim is to situate the reader in the national and local context. But in 
addition, my intention with this chapter is to provide a peek at the landscape of vulnerability in 
the central Andes of Peru. 
In Chapter Three I provide an overview of the Parón conflict. This disagreement unfolds 
in a context where access to water is shaped by governance arrangements, and where these 
arrangements are in turn shaped by changing institutions, laws, and politics that benefit some 
users at the expense of others. In PL most residents heavily rely on irrigation water for their 
livelihoods. The management of its headwaters, lake Parón - that provides the large majority of 
water resources for the watershed - is key to the wellbeing of downstream communities. For over 
sixteen years, ever since the lake’s governance body moved to private hands, water users in 
Parón-Llullán have struggled to secure their access to water, and to protect their livelihoods  
(Lynch, 2012).  
This struggle, though, does not only represent the contestation and negotiation over 
access to water. The Cordillera Blanca is a disaster-prone area, where the most prominent risks 
are induced by glacial lakes. In addition to water distribution, the management of lake Parón’s 
waters is key for the mitigation of the risk of an outburst flood. Hence, with this conflict it is 
both access to water and vulnerability to disasters that are being negotiated. In the past few 
decades, as water governance arrangements changed, and today, as the establishment of new 
governance body is being negotiated, vulnerability has been and continues to be shaped and re-
shaped.   
Even though this chapter is mainly empirical, by mapping the conflict’s progression, I 
point out the ways in which the transformation of and negotiation over water governance 
arrangements have affected and are affected by the changing social, economic, and political 
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landscapes. In the first section, I focus on the conflict’s early stages, and explain how it emerged 
and developed. Since I consider the privatization of hydroelectric plant Cañón del Pato (and of 
lake Parón’s infrastructure) to be a key moment in this conflict, this section is centered on the 
social, environmental, and political consequences of this transaction. In the second section, once 
again, I study the sociopolitical consequences of yet another transformation to lake Parón’s water 
governance body. This time, however, since it was the disenfranchised who took power, PL was 
witness to a very different set of changes. While residents gained secure access to water, PL’s 
political environment grew increasingly unstable, turning victory into uncertainty.  In the third 
section, for a better understanding of the conflict, I provide a stakeholder analysis that uncovers 
positions, underlying interests and user group strengths and weaknesses. Bringing context for the 
subsequent section, which discusses the challenges to negotiations, this analysis brings to light 
the stark differences between stakeholders, and the ways in which they perceive each other. In 
the final section, I explore the negotiation process. Even though the key actors necessary to move 
the conflict forward are present, and the main topics of concern appear to be discussed, the 
stakeholder broken relations are proving to be a major deterrent to achieving any type of 
agreement.  
I use the fourth chapter to explore the ways in which water governance and vulnerability 
are co-produced. However, rather than exploring vulnerability as a whole, I focus my analysis on 
the specific drivers that are directly related to lake Parón and the management of its waters. In 
the first section, I provide the theoretical foundation for the study. I introduce political ecology to 
then explain the analytical framework I use for my assessment. After a brief review of research 
on vulnerability and water governance theory (Adger, 2006; Bakker, 2003; Budds & Hinojosa, 
2012; Cutter, 2006; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008; Perreault, 2005; Ribot, 2009) I explain the ways 
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in which I conceptualize and use these terms in my analysis. In the second section, I analyze the 
relationship between water governance and vulnerability. For this, I borrow from Budds and 
Hinojosa’s (2012) framework of analysis and recognize the relation between water governance 
and vulnerability in Parón as embodied in, and expressed by, a range of ‘moments’ or instances 
that I use to examine this relationship.  
While I analyze Parón’s landscape of vulnerability throughout the conflict, I place 
particular emphasis on the effects that the introduction of technology to the lake have had on PL 
residents’ vulnerability. In my view, the construction of water infrastructure in Parón is a key 
moment because this technology, along with the possibility to manage the lake’s waters, allow 
for vulnerability and water governance to be directly linked, and to have a two-way relationship. 
Ever since this relationship was established, the landscape of vulnerability has been altered 
significantly. In an environment driven by conflict, and characterized by its political instability, 
changes to vulnerability became more abrupt and unpredictable. As I show in this chapter, while 
PL’s vulnerability continues to fluctuate with the changes in governance arrangements, the effect 
of discourses and perceptions of vulnerability on the determination of Parón’s water governance 
becomes evident as stakeholders negotiate the lake’s water management.   
Finally, in the fifth chapter, the conclusion, I provide a short summary of my discussions 
and provide recommendations on ways in which the state can begin to think about dealing with 
this problem.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REGIONAL CONTEXT: HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL SETTINGS 
 
 
This chapter serves to provide the reader with contextual knowledge of the 
environmental, historical, economic, and cultural settings in which the conflict unfolds. The first 
section introduces the reader to Peru’s water challenges. After providing an overview of the 
major water issues threatening the country’s economic and social stability, I explore the ways in 
which the government is dealing with them, and analyze the impact of these actions on water 
users from Andean communities, such as the ones studied. In the second section, changing the 
scale of analysis to the regional and local scales, I provide an overview of socioeconomic and 
environmental trends in the study region – Ancash department and Callejón de Huaylas.22 I give 
particular attention to local livelihood practices, and water needs in the area. Finally, in the third 
section, I explore the local water supply vis-a-vis water demand. While climatic fluctuations are 
diminishing the quantity and reliability of usual water sources, economic, social and political 
policies continue to plan for a growth and expansion that will only increase water demand. Given 
the declining trend in water supply, I show the precarious situation of a growing number of users 
with opposing water demands, and the ways in which these competing needs further aggravate 
the local water pressure.  
PERU’S GROWING WATER CHALLENGES 
Peru is a country that faces serious social and environmental water issues. First, the 
spatial patterns and trends of water supply and demand in the country represent a serious 
challenge to sustain future development. While the majority of population and economic 
development are centered in the arid coast, most water resources are located in Amazonian Peru. 
                         
22 The Callejón de Huaylas is the inter-Andean valley where the research area is located. For more information see the “Natural 
Landscapes” section in this chapter.  
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In this light, the Peruvian government is struggling to determine how to better allocate and 
govern the resource. Second, climate change and the consequential patterns of increasing glacial 
melt, impose an imminent threat of water scarcity. Today, most water use for coastal 
development originates from the Andean glaciers. With this water source dwindling, the 
country’s economic stability and growth is put at risk. Furthermore, as explored in the following 
sections, in addition to affecting the economy, water cycle changes provoked by climate change 
increase the risk of natural disasters in areas such as Cordillera Blanca.  
GEOGRAPHIES OF WATER USE: A SPATIALLY DISPARATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND  
With a population of almost thirty million 
people, Peru is the fourth most populous country in 
South America (US Department of State, 2011). 
Close to 30% of the total population currently lives 
in the metropolitan area of Lima/Callao (El 
Comercio, 2011c). Having such a strong political 
and socioeconomic centralization, Peru faces a 
series of challenges. In fact, during the last decade 
the government was re-structured in an attempt to 
de-centralize country. Among the several 
challenges of a centralized economy is the allocation of natural resources. In Peru’s case the use 
and distribution of water is particularly difficult.  
 Seventy percent of the country’s population inhabits the coastal desert, and since only 
two percent of the water supplies are found in this area (Trigoso Rubio, 2007), people mainly 
Figure 3: Peru's Topography. Source: http://www.gg.uwyo.edu 
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rely on glaciers from the Andes, or sierra, for their water use.23 In fact, there are many 
watersheds in the coast 
that are experiencing 
water scarcity already 
(see Figure 4). In 
addition, the booming 
industry of export-
oriented agriculture, 
that is also located in 
the arid coast, requires 
large volumes of water 
(Painter, 2007). 
According to studies conducted by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the major uses of fresh 
water in Peru are agriculture, mining, industrial and energetic; with agriculture (80%), domestic 
and industrial (18%) and mining (2%) being the most important uses in 2004 (Oficina General de 
Planificación Agraria, MINAG, 2008).  
According to ANA, the country’s demand for water is increasing mainly due to further 
development in the production sector, primarily in agriculture, which represented 80% of the 
total water use in 2010. Domestic use, particularly, is expected to grow as urban population 
continues to increase, and as the government begins to implement ‘Agua para todos’, an 
                         
23 The coast covers approximately ten percent of the national territory. This narrow desert area is home to approximately two-
thirds of the total population and contains the majority of economic development activities in Peru (BBC, 2011).The sierra  is the 
area that encompasses the Andes mountains and that covers approximately thirty one percent of the national territory. This area, 
which ranges from 2,000 to 6,700 m.a.s.l (meters above sea level), stretches from the northern to southern ends of the country 
(Figure 3). Sierra temperatures vary according to altitude, ranging from valleys to freezing highlands and snow-covered peaks. 
Figure 4: This map depicts the Peru's per capita water availability for one year. Note that, the 
emphasized watersheds, all on the desert coast, are those who already experience water scarcity. 
Source: Ministry of the Environment (http://www.minam.gob.pe/foro/) 
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ambitious program that expects to increase access to water and sewage throughout the country.24 
As most economic activity takes place in the coastal desert, these increasing rates of water 
demand similarly originate in this area. To this day demand continues to grow; however, the 
prospects for economic growth and development in the country begin to weaken because the 
main water source for this area - glacial melt water – is beginning to decrease.25 As water 
scarcity in coastal Peru becomes a growing threat, the government continues struggle to decipher 
ways to alleviate this trend. In fact, reports from ANA suggest exploring water transfer between 
watersheds, probably a multimillion dollar project that would engender conflicts very similar to 
the one studied in this thesis  (Autoridad Nacional del Agua, 2009).  
Given this scenario, it is likely that the struggle for water access will intensify throughout 
the country and that minority communities and small-farmers in the Andes will suffer most from 
it.26 In addition to facing a future of water scarcity Peru’s legal and institutional framework for 
water governance has drastically changed since 2009. Even though these changes promote 
decentralization, a cross-sectoral water use, and user-groups participation, to critics they appear 
to favor strong economic actors and reinforce inequitable access to the resource (Budds & 
Hinojosa, 2012; Lynch, 2010).    
CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER SCARCITY 
Climate change is producing a plethora of issues at the environmental and socioeconomic 
levels, including fluctuations to temperature and precipitations, increased rate of glacial melt, 
water stress, damaged livelihoods, increased migration, and increased disease rates (Bury et al., 
                         
24  “Agua para todos” is a public program that was formulated in 2006 by then president Alan García. The program is being 
financed by public and private entities as well as the Inter-American Development Bank and it aims to improve quality of life and 
health of its beneficiaries by significantly expanding water supply and sewage systems. The five year program is targeting to 
increase access of 49,000 families to drinking water and 57,000 to sewage systems (IABD, 2007). Even though the program 
aimed to target disenfranchised populations, it has been criticized for benefiting Lima’s resident’s only.  
25 For more details see the climate change section on this chapter. 
26 These populations are particularly vulnerable because they heavily rely on water for their livelihoods. In addition, as I explain 
later in this chapter, it is likely that the newly implemented Water Resources Law will favor industrial water demands. 
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2011; Fraser, 2009; Trigoso Rubio, 2007). Scientists have ranked Peru as in the top twenty 
countries with higher risk to climate related disasters (Brooks & Adger, 2003). Even though all 
these issues pose serious threats to the population, glacial melt and the prospect of water scarcity 
are the impacts most often studied by experts and policy makers (Bradley et al., 2006; Llosa et 
al., 2009; Portocarrero et al., 2008).  A potential decline of glacial water supply places the 
country in a critical situation, making it the most water stressed in South America (Bebbington & 
Williams, 2008). 
Glacial recession in Peru is widely recorded (Bury et al., 2011; Bradley et al., 2009; 
Georges, 2004; Mark & Seltzer, 2005). The Andes region encompasses 95% of all tropical 
glaciers in the world; 71% of which are located in Peru (Llosa et al., 2009). The country has 
experienced a widespread loss of glaciers. In 1997 the Cordillera Blanca lost 16% of its total 
recorded area in 1970 (Llosa et al., 2009). In 2005, Broggi glacier, also within this range, 
disappeared. While there are many scholars who study the physical aspects of glacial recession, 
in the past few years, experts and policy makers have begun to investigate its social effects. 
The study of social effects of glacial retreat is vital in Peru because of the potential 
threats it imposes on the country. In addition to representing a serious threat for its economic and 
social development, de-glaciation is increasing the prospect of water scarcity in the Andean and 
coastal regions of Peru  (Young & Lipton, 2006). Populations in Andean Peru are particularly 
vulnerable because their livelihoods are heavily reliant on glacial water. Furthermore, glacial 
melt is exposing Andean cities and communities to natural hazards because new glacial lakes are 
forming in unstable places (Unidad de Glaciología y Recursos Hídricos, 2010). Inhabitants of 
towns and cities nearby the Cordillera Blanca are particularly vulnerable since this area 
encompasses the largest concentration of glaciers in the country (Chuquisengo & Ferradas, 
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2007).  
A SHIFTING WATER GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
As a response to these serious threats, the Peruvian government is exploring a series of 
different approaches, including increasing the reliance on technology and improving the 
governance system to better organize water allocation and reduce wasteful practices. In this 
section, I elaborate on the former water governance framework. I focus my analysis particularly 
on the recent changes to Peru’s legal and institutional framework of water governance, and on its 
implications for populations such as those in PL.  
Until 2009 the country’s water resources were governed according to the 1969 Ley 
General de Aguas or General Water Law. This legislation, supporting the recently passed 
agrarian reform, took power away from private owners and for the first time in the country’s 
history, framed water as a public good. This framework distributed the responsibility to control 
the resource among ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Energy and Mines, and Ministry of Housing. Of all these, the ministry of Agriculture 
had the most authority and power, after all, this legislation was designed to reinforce agricultural 
development, particularly on the coast of Peru (Oré, 2005). In the 1990s, the Fujimori 
administration restructured the general water law’s legal framework to further incentivize 
economic investments on large scale agriculture, to expand international investments especially 
on mining, and to promote privatization of water treatment facilities (Oré et al., 2009). 
In 2009, as a response to changes in the nature and structure of the Peruvian state,27 to 
facilitate significantly different water use needs, and to respond to the increasingly important 
threat of water scarcity, the Peruvian legal structure for water governance was drastically 
                         
27 In 2003, the Peruvian state began a process of decentralization (Ley de Bases de la Decentralización  - Ley No 27783). To 
reinforce this effort, as opposed to the 1969 water legislation, the 2009 legislation, presents a decentralization component.  
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changed. First of all, the responsibility to manage the resource was transferred from the different 
ministries to a single government institution, ANA. The National Water Authority was created in 
2008. This new cross-sectoral, autonomous, and decentralized organization was set out to have 
presence at the regional and local level. At the regional level, the organization plans to have 14 
Autoridad Administrativa del Agua or Administrative Water Authorities (AAA), and at the local 
level, in each major river basin, the organization will be represented by ALA. These changes 
were intended to ‘fill the gap in water governance that previously existed between the national 
level and the irrigation district’ (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012, p. 127). However, since restructuring 
efforts began fairly recently, and ANA’s presence in the regions is only beginning to appear, 
even though it is too soon to tell how successful these efforts will be, some of the processes that 
are being used raise a few red flags.   
An important interest behind all these changes was to further promote the country’s 
administrative decentralization. In 2003 the Peruvian government began a process of 
decentralization. Regional governments were created and given the responsibility to implement 
policies related to the provision of social services in their territory (Oré et al., 2009). With the 
2009 Water Resources Law the responsibility to create and design of water related policies 
remained with the central government; however, the implementation and sustainable 
management of the resource were assigned to the regional governments. While this effort 
promises to improve representation and participation of disenfranchised populations, fieldwork 
indicates that on the ground, thus far, this is far from reality. The coordination needed for a 
proper decentralization process is obstructed because regional and local governments remain 
disconnected from wider political-economic processes (such as economic development and land 
use planning) (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). In addition, the process used for de-centralizing water 
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management is raising concern among researchers. Oré et al. (2009) point to the danger of giving 
the central government authority to design water policies but assigning responsibility to the 
regions. Furthermore, fieldwork indicates that while regional and local actors are assigned tasks, 
they do not receive sufficient funds to get them done properly. For instance, in the case study 
area, this particular problem is further aggravating relations between the government and PL’s 
residents. While Huaraz’s ALA, as a part of the new law’s implementation, had the obligation to 
formalize water rights all throughout the area, given the lack of financial resources and time, 
they failed to properly explain the legislation among others to water users in PL. As a result, PL 
irrigators interpreted these efforts as yet another governmental gimmick set up to take away their 
water rights. Hence, they refused to cooperate with the project (Field notes, 2011). 
With this in mind, and as others have argued, there is little evidence that efforts to 
integrate voices and opinions at different levels of government, along with those of citizens, are 
reducing tensions between different users and interests (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). Particularly, I 
am referring to the participatory aspect of the 2009 law, which intends to promote coordinated 
development and to bring about ‘social and economic welfare in an equitable manner’ (GWP-
TAC, 2000). However, similar to other studies, fieldwork indicates that, rather than securing 
local water rights and resulting in equitable water distribution, participatory processes further 
ignite conflicts and distrust and potentially make disenfranchised users even more vulnerable  
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). I acknowledge that since my analysis derives from a conflictive 
environment, it will lead to a biased argument that should probably not be generalized to the 
country level. However, given the prospect of water scarcity in the country, a context such as the 
one in PL will probably become more common throughout the country. 
The effects of climate change, especially de-glaciation and water scarcity, are very 
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influential on this new legal framework. Among other approaches for these challenges, is the 
promotion of a more ‘efficient’ use of water, which is believed to be achieved by increasing the 
use of technology and by treating water as an economic good.28 In fact, regulations of the 2009 
Water Resources Law mandate the establishment of ‘parameters’ for efficiency, the promotion of 
technology use,29 and the management of water as an economic good.30 Regulation article 102 
even allows AAAs to remove water rights from users when if not paying for two consecutive 
times. 
These approaches to water scarcity are quite problematic because they appear to further 
reinforce inequity. Treating water as an economic good will intensify competition over the 
resource, and end up allocating it in a way that will benefit those who are economically 
powerful, and who happen to have needs for higher quantities of water. With a prospect of 
increasing conflicts over water, this approach, if implemented as thus far it has been in Parón, 
will likely hinder, rather than promote, cooperation among water users.  
PARÓN WATER CONFLICT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGION’S SOCIAL AND NATURAL 
LANDSCAPES 
NATURAL LANDSCAPES 
 The Parón conflict takes place in the central highlands of Peru, within one of the most 
resource abundant departments in the country, Ancash. The territory of Ancash Department 
expands through the geographic regions of the costa and sierra (Figure 1). The sierra in 
particular has a unique topography, which is characterized by the presence of two almost parallel 
                         
28 This approach originates from the 1992 Dublin Principles, particularly from Principle 4 that recognizes water as ‘a public good 
that has social and economic value in all its competing uses’. The Dublin Principles are expert water governance 
recommendations that had a significant influence on strategies presented to the 1992 World Summit in Rio. As a result, 
supranational actors such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development bank, who had an important role during the 
development of the 2009 Water Resources Law, promote these approaches (Comisión Técnica Multisectorial- Gobierno del Perú, 
2003).  
29 D.S. 001-2010-AG, Article 31, 35, 40.  
30 D.S. 001-2010-AG, Article 102. 
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ranges on the western Andes: Cordillera Blanca or the white range, and Cordillera Negra or 
black range. The Cordillera Negra is smaller than the Cordillera Blanca and is located to the west 
of it. It is characterized by its various ridges, its steep, almost vertical, rocky slopes, and its 
relative dryness (since it has no glaciers). The Cordillera Blanca, by contrast, encompasses a 
series of snowcapped mountains that are the highest in Peru (MINCETUR, 2002), and is the 
highest tropical range in the world. Approximately half of its peaks are covered in snow and ice, 
which serve as an important source of water and attract vast numbers of tourists (Bradley et al., 
2006). The Cordillera Blanca is home to PL watershed. The Parón water conflict unfolds in an 
area that extends from the glaciers of the Cordillera Blanca to the valley located between both 
mountain ranges, the Callejón de Huaylas (Figure 1). 
 The Cordillera Negra and Cordillera Blanca are separated by the Callejón de Huaylas, an 
inter-Andean valley in the Santa river valley that stretches for 150km from north to south and 
that ranges in altitude from 4,000 m.a.s.l, at its southern end, to 2,000 at its northern end 
(MINCETUR, 2002). This valley is home to arable lands thanks to the Santa river, which 
traverses the valley in its entirety and provides it with a constant flow of water. With a dry and 
temperate climate and a continuous flow of water, agriculture, especially at lower altitudes, is the 
most important livelihood source to its inhabitants. Table 1 shows the importance of agriculture 
in the provinces where the Santa River traverses, and especially in rural areas. The study area, 
which is within the province of Huaylas, is no different. While agriculture is the most popular 
economic activity, it is not the one that generates the most income. Scholars and policy makers 
associate reliance on agriculture with poverty (Trivelli, Escobal, & Revesz, 2009). Agricultural 
production in Ancash is allocated primarily for family consumption, followed by 
commercialization. Whereas coastal farming in Ancash is characterized by large agro-export 
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projects in large land holdings, the majority of Ancashinos31 working on agriculture are 
smallholder farmers who live mostly in rugged highlands terrain (MINAG, 2011). 
Table 1: Reliance on Agriculture on Provinces along the Santa River 
Province    Total PEA*   PEA working on Agriculture   %  
 Huaráz         52 131                                         10 213  
     
20  
 Rural         10 920                                           7 309  
     
67  
 Carhuaz         12 769                                           7 342  
     
57  
 Rural           7 569                                           5 559  
     
73  
 Corongo           2 497                                           1 308  
     
52  
 Rural           1 114                                              747  
     
67  
 Huaylas         15 872                                           8 690  
     
55  
 Rural           9 304                                           7 345  
     
79  
 Recuay           5 447                                           2 210  
     
41  
 Rural           2 224                                           1 350  
     
61  
 Santa       143 176                                         17 429  
     
12  
 Rural           9 002                                           7 144  
     
79  
 Yungay         16 430                                         10 743  
     
65  
 Rural         11 415                                           9 296  
     
81  
 *PEA is the population in working age.  
    Source: INEI, 2007  
   The Santa watershed (Figure 6) is Peru’s most extensive watershed draining to the 
Pacific Ocean (Pouyard, Yerren, & Zapata, 2005) and Ancash’s chief source of water. Stretching 
for over 335 km, the Santa River originates in Lake Conococha, at an altitude of 4050 m.a.s.l. 
and drains into the Pacific Ocean after flowing through the hydroelectric plant in Huallanca and 
the Cañón del Pato gorge.    
SOCIAL LANDSCAPES 
Ancash’s territory is a complex and heterogeneous space that extends through the Peruvian 
costa and sierra. In addition to being characterized for having a variety of natural landscapes, 
Ancash encompasses a plethora of socioeconomic characteristics. Since the conflict studied takes 
                         
31 Term used to refer to a person from Ancash. 
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place in the Andean area, I will emphasize the social and environmental dynamics of the 
Ancashino Andes.  
As a mainly rural area, Andean Ancash 
inhabitants have fewer sources of livelihood than 
in urban Peru. The most common activities 
include farming, herding, mining, and fishing 
(INEI, 2010a). Overall, the vast majority work on 
agriculture; however, this livelihood source is 
increasingly becoming unreliable. Given climatic 
fluctuations, small farmers are experiencing crop 
failure more and more often (Personal 
communication, ALA representative, June 8, 
2010). Additionally, not only do these farmers 
hardly produce enough to survive, but because of market oriented policies in the agrarian sector 
and free trade agreements, they are also isolated from the national market economy  (Trivelli, 
Shimisu, & Glave, 2003); thus, generally they experience widespread poverty. In the case of PL, 
many farmers expressed concern for their livelihoods, because these trends, in addition to the 
struggle for water, are forcing many to sell their lands to large agricultural companies and move 
elsewhere (for more detail see stakeholder analysis section of Chapter Three). 
Contrary to the reduction of poverty rates portrayed by census data at the departmental level 
(INEI, 2010b), the majority of districts in Andean Ancash remain in poverty or extreme poverty; 
a situation that is aggravated by the lack of infrastructure and limited access to social services. 
According to Forosalud’s national coordinator, 30% of Ancashinos do not have access to any 
Figure 5: Cordillera Blanca Hydrology: Santa Watershed Source: 
Autoridad Nacional del Agua 
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type of health services due to the lack of infrastructure in the Andean area32 (RPP, 2011a). In 
2011, a study concluded that over 50% of the area’s infant population suffers from either chronic 
malnutrition or anemia (RPP, 2011b). Similarly, limited access to education contributes to rural 
Ancashino poverty. While in 2007 92% of all rural children between six and eleven years old 
attended school, only 83% between the ages of twelve and sixteen did so (INEI, 2009a); 
suggesting that some children drop out of school to work. This is a quite serious problem 
because with a rural illiteracy rate of 26% Ancashinos are further limiting their opportunities to 
diversify their livelihood.  
Similarly, limited access to other public services such as electricity, water, and sewage, 
contributes to rural poverty and social vulnerability.33 According to the 2007 national census, on 
average over 50% of all households in Ancashino Andean districts do not have access to any 
type of sewage system (INEI, 2009a). Additionally, in this same area, an average 80% of 
households use primarily firewood for cooking, an energy source that, according to the scientific 
community, is linked to greater risks of respiratory diseases and mortality (Riojas Rodriguez et 
al., 2001). In addition to limiting people’s livelihoods, the lack of social services renders Andean 
Ancashinos more vulnerable to disease.  
In summation, factors such as insufficient infrastructure, limited access to public services, 
insecure livelihoods, and exclusion from benefits of development policies, demonstrate the 
degree of inequality in Peru. These factors clearly indicate that Andean Ancashinos have been 
continuous victims of the Peruvian social system. And with this system their status of second 
class citizens is reinforced and the social dynamics by which Andeans are made vulnerable 
elucidate.  
                         
32 Forosalud is a Peruvian civil society organization that promotes social justice in regards to health issues.  
33 Social vulnerability refers a person, organization, or society’s lack of capacity to endure negative impacts from social 
interactions, institutions, and systems of cultural values (Oliver-Smith et al., 2012). 
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It is in such a divided social context that the Parón water conflict takes place. While the three 
PL communities involved in the conflict – Caráz, Campiña, and Cruz de Mayo – experience 
these dynamics of exclusion in different ways,34 fieldwork results indicate that they all resent the 
government for its absence and acknowledge the ways in which the Peruvian social system 
segregates them. In addition to this picture of segregation against the rural Andes, an assessment 
of the water pressure under which this conflict takes place, will facilitate the reader’s 
understanding of some of the reasons that ignited the conflict and that prevent it from moving 
forward. 
INCREASING WATER PRESSURE: DIMINISHING SUPPLY AND INCREASING DEMAND 
This section brings to light an increasingly common situation throughout Peru. One in 
which a growing demand for water will likely surpass its diminishing supply. In this case, to set 
up the context for Parón’s conflict, I explore the water challenges already affecting the Santa 
river – of which Parón-Llullán is a tributary.  
DIMINISHING SUPPLY 
The Santa River is well known for having a constant flow of water throughout the year; a 
characteristic that allows for the successful development of activities such as agriculture and 
hydroelectric generation In fact, the Santa watershed is home to the largest hydropower centers 
in the country, and allows for the development of massive irrigation projects such as 
Chavimochic and Chinecas (Figure 6).35All of this is made possible only because the Santa, 
                         
34 These communities experience segregation and are socially vulnerable in different ways, which are mainly shaped by their 
livelihoods, location, and history. Since Cruz de Mayo is an indigenous community which is located in a segregated area, they 
experience vulnerability in a way that differs significantly from Caráz and Campiña. For more information see stakeholder 
analysis section of Chapter Three. 
35Chavimochic is an irrigation project located to the north of Ancash, at the coast of La Libertad department. This multi-million 
dollar project aims to guarantee access to water to 144,386 Ha in the dry coastal valley of La Libertad. This project relies solely 
on waters from the Santa River, complicating the water governance challenges in the Santa Watershed. Chinecas is a hydro-
energetic project located in the arid coast of Ancash. It is managed by the regional government of Ancash. This project 
encompasses the management of water for agricultural, energetic, industrial, and domestic uses. This project also adds to the sets 
of demands to be met by the Santa waters. 
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unlike other rivers in 
the country, is fed by 
perennial glacial melt 
and multiannual 
rainfall. Among the 
many glacial lakes that 
feed into the Santa river 
is lake Parón. However, 
while its water flows 
constantly, this flow 
does not remain 
constant throughout the 
year. It discharges 80% 
of its annual volume 
during the four months 
of rainy season, and only 20% during the eight months of dry season (MINEM, 2006). The 
uniqueness of this river, along with the benefits of its constant flow brings, are less secure than it 
would originally seem. Relatively recent variations in weather patterns have catalyzed the 
melting of glaciers and increased the precipitation variability. In doing so, these fluctuating 
climatic patterns have made the reduction of water flow imminent, and thus have placed at risk 
the fulfillment of current competing water demands in the watershed. 
a. Glacial Melt 
The Cordillera Blanca is one of the most researched glacier regions in the world (Mark et al., 
Figure 6: Santa watershed water uses. Source: Lynch, 2012 
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2010). Hydrologic studies of the Santa river watershed expose the significance of glacier melt to 
water supply in the basin under current conditions (Condom et al., 2011). This water source has 
become a particularly important water source because the rate of glacial melt has increased 
significantly since the 1970s (PNUD, 2007). In the upper watershed, melting glacier ice 
contributes annually with at least 10% of the total water, and potentially as much as 20% (Mark 
and Seltzer, 2005). Water contribution from lower watershed glaciers, including Artesoncocha, 
Parón and Llanganuco, is more significant (see Figure 7). Overall, the Cordillera Blanca supplies 
the Santa river with up to 40% of its water year round, and up to 66% during the dry season 
(Mark, 2008). Paradoxically, while glacial melt water helps secure Callejón de Huaylas residents 
and Santa river water users’ livelihoods – including those in PL – it also makes them vulnerable 
to water stress. The more the glaciers melt today, the less water they will have from glaciers in 
the future.  
Glaciers in the Cordillera Blanca are rapidly diminishing (Bradley et al., 2006; Mark, 2008; 
Vuille et al., 2008). Deglaciation rates vary within the ranges, being the higher altitude basins 
slower at melting than those at lower altitudes (Pouyard et al., 2005). Whereas in the 1930’s ice 
coverage was estimated to range from 800- 850 km2, in the 1990s it was measured as only 620 
km2 (Georges, 2004). Glacial retreat is so critical, that even some researchers have argued that 
the Santa river has already passed peak water (Morello, 2011).   
b. Precipitation 
The usual rainfall pattern at the Cordillera Blanca area is characterized by the presence of 
two well defined seasons: (1) the dry season, from May to September, when precipitation is 
almost absent, and (2) the wet season, from October to April, with peak times during February 
and March (Figure 8). In Huaráz, the capital city of Ancash located at the heart of the Callejón de 
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Huaylas, receives almost 60% of its total rainfall from December to March, and only 0.2% from 
June to August (Lavado et al., 2005). However, this pattern is beginning to change. As 
mentioned before, the effects of climate change are causing this cyclical pattern to fluctuate 
(Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 7: Average monthly runoff in the Santa Watershed. 
Source:http://www.senamhi.gob.pe/pdf/estudios/paper_RRHHSANTA.pdf 
 
Rainfall fluctuation presents serious obstacles for the region’s economic development. First, 
since much of the highland farming is rain-fed, it makes the poorest populations (including those 
in PL) even more vulnerable (Bury et al., 2011). According to local small-farmers in PL, 
unpredictable weather continuously diminishes their yields by introducing new crop pests they 
are not prepared to eradicate, and by leading to highly unreliable irrigation (Field notes, 2010). 
Second, given that in the future, Santa water flows will mainly rely on rainfall, multiple 
downstream water needs will have to adjust to a diminishing, and unreliable, water supply.  
Currently, there is a deficit of water during the Santa river’s dry season. The quantity of 
water demanded is higher than what the river can supply (Portocarrero, 1992). Researchers 
forecasts that “as the glaciers disappear the river will depend on annual precipitation, and its dry 
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season volume will be less than combined domestic, agricultural, and hydroelectric demand — 
demand that is rapidly expanding with urbanization and construction of vast coastal irrigation 
schemes for export agriculture” (Lynch, 2010). Thus, increasing water demand will only 
aggravate this precarious situation. 
 
Figure 8: Average monthly multiannual precipitation in the weather stations of the Santa 
Watershed Source: http://www.senamhi.gob.pe/pdf/estudios/paper_RRHHSANTA.pdf 
 
INCREASING DEMAND 
The Santa river and its tributaries are a critical source of water for urban and agricultural 
needs of approximately one million people living in the upper portion of the Santa river 
watershed (Condom et al., 2011). Downstream from the highland urban areas, the Santa river 
flows through the steep Cañón del Pato, where the water is used for hydropower generation, and 
then reaches the coastal plain, to provide for urban needs and the two growing irrigation projects 
of Chavimochic and Chinecas (Figure 6). 
In this section, although I acknowledge the existence of various important water needs 
downstream, given the location of my study area, I will limit my analysis to highland water 
demand. Table 2 shows the main economic activities driving water use in the area.  
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Table 2: Economic activities driving water use along highland Santa River 
 
Population 
Center 
(see Figure 1) 
 
 
Elevation  
Distance from 
headwaters 
(km) 
 
 
Water uses 
Conococha 4,050 m 
13,162 ft 
headwaters livestock, fishing,  
tourism-- Huascarán National Park. 
Recuay 3,400 m 
11,050 ft 
62  livestock, mining, agroforestry, high altitude agriculture (potato, oca, tarwi, 
barley, quinoa) 
Huaráz 3,090 m 
10,042 ft 
88 gold mining; urban development; tourism; high altitude agriculture, 
livestock 
Carhuaz 2,650 m 
8612 ft 
126 corn, potato, bean cultivation, small-scale lime and coal mines, urban  
Yungay 2500 m 
8125 ft  
153 km corn, potato, bean, fruit cultivation; livestock, urban  
Caráz 2290 m 
7442 ft 
163 km agribusiness citrus, cut flower production, food production; gold mining 
tourism 
Huallanca 1820 m 
5,915 ft 
205 km hydroelectric plant; 
arid– little or no agriculture 
 Source: Lynch and Galewski, 2010. 
a. Tourism 
Huascarán National Park, the main tourist attraction in the area, has received an increasing 
number of visitors in the past few years. Whereas in 1987 it received almost 70,000 visitors, in 
the year 2000 it received almost 110,000 people and in 2011 over 125,000 visitors (INRENA, 
2003; UNEP, 2011). Park officials expect this trend to continue. In addition, they are beginning 
to work more closely with nearby communities to create new sources of livelihood. While 
increasing tourism brings development to the area, it also puts more pressure on water resources. 
The more tourists this area receives, the more demands for water it will have. Scholars studying 
the effects of tourism on local communities have warned about changes in local water use 
patterns. For example, in the past, hotels have redirected the use of fresh water, leaving barely 
enough for local small farmers (Mandan and Rawat, 2000). Furthermore, being that it is 
42 
 
 
precisely the glaciers that attract tourists in this area, local livelihoods can be rendered vulnerable 
if communities become heavily reliant on tourism. For example the community of Catac, a few 
miles south of Caráz, suffered heavy economic losses when tourists stopped passing through 
their town because nearby glacier Pastoruri nearly disappeared.  While the prospect of heavy 
reliance on tourism represents a risk for local livelihoods, the current dependence on agriculture 
is also becoming making livelihoods vulnerable. 
b. Agriculture 
As previously mentioned, agriculture is the most common livelihood source in the Callejón 
de Huaylas area, with potato, maize, and bean being the predominant crops in the upper valley 
and flowers, fruit, and artichokes in the lower valley (see Table 2; Field notes, 2011). In addition, 
this area is home to different types of agricultural practices: subsistence, domestic market-
oriented, and export-oriented. Overall, these agricultural types segregate according to elevation 
in the catchment, with subsistence in the upper catchment, domestic commercial production in 
the middle area (in Callejón de Huaylas), and export-oriented commercial production in the 
lower catchment, near the coast.  
The large majority of farmers in Callejón de Huaylas are engaged in small and medium scale 
work. Current numbers show that 70% of these have farms smaller than one hectare (Foro Agua 
Santa, 2011). Even though this area does not have a significant presence of large scale 
agriculture, this practice continues to grow and contributes largely to the water stress situation. 
Researchers report that since the late 1990’s large scale agricultural production activities have 
been shifting towards water intensive, irrigated, high-value crop production in the Callejón de 
Huaylas (INEI, 2007; Painter, 2007 in Bury et al., 2011)  
The water situation in this area is so critical that 60% of water commissions are no longer 
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accepting new users36 (Foro Agua Santa, 2011). This situation elucidates the need for adaptation 
to environmental change and capacity building (Bury et al., 2011). Water users and public 
officials constantly refer to the need to preserve water in the face of future scarcity. However, on 
the ground, day to day practices, continue to be as wasteful as usual (Field notes, 2010). In the 
study area, public servants blame these wasteful practices on the farmer’s ‘lack of knowledge’ 
and organization. Conversely, local small and medium farmers point to the need to improve the 
available infrastructure and the government’s unwillingness to help (Field notes, 2011). 
c. Hydropower 
Peru is a country that is experiencing fast economic growth; consequently, its demand for 
energy is rapidly increasing. Projected demand growth rates will require supply to duplicate 
every seven to ten years (El Comercio, 2011a). From the year 2000 to 2007 electric demand 
increased by 49% (Barco et al., 2008). Its supply increased only by 25%. In the past few years, 
northern Peru has been facing energetic insecurity mainly caused by droughts (Barco et al., 
2008). In the later months of 2011, this area experienced electricity deficit and officials nearly 
began importing electricity from Ecuador (El Comercio, 2011b). Even though the problem was 
solved by rationing energy, the risk of electricity power cuts in this area is still present. 
The country’s electricity supply is highly dependent on hydroelectric energy. According to 
2007 Figures, 54% of the country’s energetic supply was provided by hydropower (Barco et al., 
2008). Peru’s hydroelectric industry is connected through a network that consists of three 
different groups: generating, transmitting, and distributing organizations (Figure 9). This 
network allows for deficits in some areas to be covered by supply elsewhere. Thus, in the case of 
Callejón de Huaylas, electricity generation of local plants does not solely supply the local 
                         
36 Because of the lack of access to land and water for agriculture, many young people are emigrating from the area (Foro Agua 
Santa, 2011). 
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demand. 
The Santa River is home to four hydroelectric plants between the Cordillera Blanca and the 
coast, these generate a substantial amount of electricity  (Mark, 2008). Of particular interest to 
this study is The Callejón de Huaylas’ hydroelectric plant Cañón del Pato. This hydropower 
plant is operated by Duke Energy and its subsidiary Egenor. Given the uneven flow of water in 
the Santa River, constant electricity generation at this particular site is made possible by the use 
of three glacial lakes as reservoirs. In addition, with the possibility of extreme flow variations in 
the future, in 2001 Egenor built the San Diego reservoir along the river; however, even with 
these additions, Duke Energy is facing problems due to water shortage. During interviews 
representatives expressed concern about the plant’s future. In 2010 the company experienced a 
financial deficit because of the limited water availability (Field notes, 2011). 
d. Urban 
In 2007, domestic water use represented 7% of the total Santa water usage (Vergara, 2007). 
The large majority of households that rely on Santa waters are located on the coastal area, 
particularly in the cities of Trujillo (the third most populous city in the country) and Chimbote 
(Rojas & Pagador, 2000). This coastal area is characterized by its high urbanization rates, which 
are mainly driven by rural to urban migration (SENAHMI, 2009). The consequential population 
growth rate in the area is further increasing the water pressure along with the vulnerability of the 
families which depend on Santa waters for their domestic use.  
According to the latest Peruvian census, in 2007 there were almost 170,000 inhabitants in the 
major urban centers of Callejón de Huaylas.37 Additionally, 18,000 people received water 
                         
37 This includes the city of Huaráz (114,242), and the towns of Recuay (5,501), Orellos (3,665), Carhuaz (12,905), Yungay 
(20,149) and Caráz (25,204) . 
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licenses for domestic use in 2010. Even though domestic use does not represent a large portion 
of the overall water demand in the area, both primary and domestic38 uses are the ones of 
foremost importance according to Peruvian law.  
 
Figure 9: National Interconnected Electric System (SEIN). SEIN serves 85% of the 
population. In 2010 Hydroelectric generation represented 58% and Thermal was 42%. Source: 
COES (Comité de Operación Económica del Sistema Interconectado Nacional). 
                         
38 Primary use encompasses all direct uses of water sources for primary needs that do not aim for profit making including 
cooking, drinking, personal hygiene, and religious and cultural ceremonies (Law 29338, Article 35).Domestic use refers to 
practices similar to primary use but where water that originates from a source that has been treated (Law 29338, Article 39).  
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e. Mining 
The department of Ancash is the fifth largest economy in the country (INEI, 2010a). The 
region’s economic importance is driven by the mining sector, which represents 15.9% its gross 
value added39 (INEI, 2010a). This appears to be the most economically prosperous sector in the 
region. The Ministry of Energy and Mines estimates immediate future investments on mining, 
for exploration and expansion, to add up to more than US$1.8 billion (MINEM, 2011). However, 
even though this industry generates the most money in Ancash, Ancashino poverty rates remain 
high. As previously mentioned, this industry is not a major employer of local labor. In 2006 it 
employed less than one percent of Ancashinos (INEI, 2006).  
Mining is one of the primary economic activities in the Callejón de Huaylas. Mine operations 
range from small scale artisanal to mines owned by transnational companies. Regardless of the 
scale of operation, mining practices are usually the cause of water-related conflicts in the area. 
These normally originate by unattended concerns over water quality (Huaráz Noticias, 2011). 
According to critics, mining operations generally contaminate water through acid drainage, 
illegal dumping, and mine tailings  (Galewski, 2010). In addition, scholars claim that it also uses 
vast amounts of water (Painter, 2007). Even though, technological advance is increasingly 
improving the sector’s water use,40 it greatly adds to the pressure on water resources faced by 
users in this area.  
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have tried to provide readers with sufficient context to understand the water 
conflict of Parón. But in addition to introducing Peru’s water conundrum, my intention was to, 
                         
39 Value of goods and services produced in the area. 
40 Representatives in the mining industry claim to recycle a large proportion of the water they use for their operations (Lynch, 
2010). 
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indirectly, provide a peek at the landscape of vulnerability in the central Andes of Peru. For this, 
I have told the story of water stress in Peru. First, I introduced emerging water challenges in Peru 
- such as climate change and the geographies of water use – to then elaborate on the 
government’s response to these threats, a new legal and institutional framework for water 
governance. Having in mind populations such as those in PL, I analyzed the implications of these 
changes. Furthermore, since my intention with this chapter is to facilitate understanding of the 
conflict, I used the subsequent section to introduce the social and environmental landscape in 
which this conflict takes place. With this, I hope to provide context for the subsequent chapter 
where I closely analyze the Parón water conflict.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CONFLICT OVER ACCESS TO AND USE OF WATER 
IN PARÓN 
        
INTRODUCTION  
 
Environmental conflicts are those that originate over unequal use of and access to natural 
resources. Critical scholars associate a rising trend of such disagreements to the emergence of 
neoliberalized development policies in Peru (Arellano-Yaguas, 2011; Bebbington & Bebbington, 
2011; Renique, 2009). These policies that introduced free trade and advocate a diminished the 
role for the government, have changed the management of the land and resources including 
water, forests, agricultural lands, and fisheries (Liverman & Vilas, 2006). Many of those who 
opposed to this trend are not against the extraction of resources per-se, but rather they protest 
how the expansion of the extractive industry is occurring. Their primary concerns are about 
problems of rights, transparency, citizenship, and environmental governance (Bebbington, 2009). 
According to Defensoría del Pueblo, in February 2012 environmental conflicts represented 58% 
of all conflicts in Peru (2012). 
This thesis addresses one such conflicts, a conflict over access to and use of water resources 
in the Andean department of Ancash. This ongoing disagreement has evolved over the course of 
sixteen years. It emerged with local discontent with Parón’s water management transition to the 
private sector, and it shifted significantly with the seizing of the lake by local water users in 
2008. In this chapter, I will introduce and explore the Parón conflict. I will also point out the 
different ways in which conflict negotiations have been affecting people’s vulnerability. While I 
tell the story of how the conflict began and evolved, I reflect on the ways in which multi-scalar 
political, social, and economic factors have contributed to the conflict’s escalation until reaching 
stalemate. In the first section, I explain how the conflict emerged and developed. When, in 1996, 
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the government privatized the nearby hydroelectric plant Cañón del Pato, and offered lake Parón 
as part of the transaction, water governance in the Parón -Llullán watershed drastically changed. 
The lake was now entirely controlled by the hydroelectric company. Downstream irrigators and 
residents found themselves struggling to have reliable access to water. After repeatedly 
complaining to the government and not receiving a proper response, local leaders decided to 
fight for their water rights and seize control of the lake.  
In the second section of this chapter, I examine the ways in which the community has been 
affected by the conflict. Community members in PL, as residents of the rural Andes, have long 
been marginalized by the larger Peruvian society. Voicing their discontent and making 
themselves heard has proven valuable in fostering cohesion amongst different local water user 
groups. The third section analyses each of the main stakeholders. This analysis introduces the 
main actors and their interests, analyses their role in shaping the conflict negotiations, and 
assesses their strengths and weaknesses for the negotiation. Cruz de Mayo, the indigenous 
community located in the upper PL watershed, has been severely affected by this conflict 
because most of the comuneros (community members) practice subsistence farming. Their main 
interest in the negotiation is to protect their livelihood. Campiña is also in the negotiation to 
protect their residents’ livelihoods, as most residents practice small-scale commercial farming. 
Campiña residents live in lower PL watershed and have better access to alternate livelihood 
activities than Cruz de Mayo comuneros do. The Municipal Government has been leaded by the 
same official for two terms now. The conflict has served the mayor as a tool to gain political 
power. From day one, his position in the negotiation has been to advocate for the community. 
The National Water Authority, conversely, advocates against the management of the lake 
entirely by locals. As the government institution responsible for the regulation of water use and 
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distribution in the country, hopes to resolve the conflict with the implementation of the 2009 
Water Resources Law. This institution has been facilitating and advocating a participatory 
process where stakeholders negotiate and plan the lake’s water management. Their main interest 
in the negotiation is to avoid responsibility for the lake’s infrastructure management and 
maintenance by re-introducing Duke Energy to the lake. The Local Water Administration, 
ANA’s representative at the local level, is perceived by locals as responsible for the water 
mismanagement that engendered the conflict. Most local residents and water user group 
representatives dismiss ALA representatives as corrupt and inefficient. ALA officials maintain 
close relations with their counterparts at the national level and adhere to their position in the 
conflict. Unlike the Water authority, Glaciología has earned the trust of the community and is 
able to communicate with them. This institution is in the negotiation to ensure the safe 
management of Parón’s water. Duke Energy, as the hydroelectric company that originated the 
conflict, has poor relations with the community and precarious relations with the government. 
The company has been ousted from the negotiations but hopes to re-gain access to the lake’s 
water in the future.  
The stakeholder analysis section serves as a precursor to the final section in which I explore 
the negotiation process. I discuss in detail the main topics negotiated, and examine the reasons 
for the outcomes we see today. 
WATER CONFLICT IN PARÓN  
 
HISTORY/CONTEXT 
 
In the late 1960s, scientists began a series of investigations at the glacial lakes of the 
Cordillera Blanca to determine the latent risk and vulnerability in the area41 (Defensoría del 
                         
41 It was actually earlier when Parón began being investigated by experts. Lake Parón came into the spotlight, and was studied by 
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Pueblo, 2008). As a part of this effort, Lake Parón was surveyed and classified as an unstable 
moraine-walled lake. While it was continuously fed by glacial melt water, it lacked proper 
natural water release mechanisms.42 These findings made evident that nearby populations were 
vulnerable to a natural hazard. Thus, to mitigate this latent hazard, in 1968 the government 
embarked on a project to lower the lake’s water level (Carey et al., 2012). The completion of the 
disaster prevention project was delayed until 1985 by technical and financial difficulties. Since 
then, Parón’s excess water release has been controlled, mitigating the risk of GLOF of nearby 
residents while at the same time providing an opportunity for an organized, and more 
‘productive’, use of this resource. 
In the early 1990s, the Peruvian government was led by Alberto Fujimori. At the time, as a 
result of economic collapse and civil war, Peru was recovering from political, social, and 
economic instability. Hoping to improve these conditions, Fujimori forged a strong neoliberal 
economic program which included structural reforms that aimed to attract foreign investment 
through privatization and pro-business economic policies43 (Mauceri, 1995). The hydroelectric 
sector experienced these particular changes in 1992 (Electroperu, 2002). During this year, 
Electroperu installed floodgates on Parón ’s drainage tunnel and ‘turned the lake into a reservoir’ 
(Carey et al., 2012, p. 185). Only two years later, in 1994, Lake Parón's waters were licensed to 
Electroperu for energy development;44 however, after the company’s privatization in 1996, the 
                                                                               
scientists for the first time in the 1940s, after a GLOF killed thousands in Huaráz (Carey et al., 2012). But it wasn’t until 1951 
that engineers began worrying about its instability (Fernandez Concha, 1957). 
42 The Lake is surrounded by five glaciers which, given increasing glacial melt rates, can potentially cause the lake to grow 
exponentially (Figure 12). However, unlike other glacial lakes in the area, Parón does not release water by overflow, instead, it 
only lets water out by infiltration through the moraine, which caused it to be unstable (Personal communication, engineer and 
former employee of Duke Energy June 10, 2010).   
43  It is through Legislative Decree N° 674, Law of Promotion of Private Investments in Government Organizations, that in 
September 1991, a process of governmental restructuration in the productive industry begins (Electroperu, 2002). 
44  License No 026-94-RCH/DR.AG.DRG/AT. 
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water license was transferred to Egenor, now a subsidiary of Duke Energy.45  
The government made a very attractive offer when placing the Cañón del Pato - the 
hydroelectric plant operated by Egenor - on the market. First, the Santa River feeds the plant 
with a continuous flow throughout the year. Second, to compensate for seasonal variation in flow 
and to meet peak demand in urban centers, the plant was provided water from glacial lakes, 
including Parón  (ICSID, 2008). Lake Parón  was a highly advantageous addition to Cañón  del 
Pato because by having control of the drainage tunnel operators would be able to release water 
according to their own needs. This particular advantage would secure the company’s ability to 
generate electricity during the dry season, and save water supplies when electricity demand is 
low. Parón would allow for a more efficient and ‘sustainable’ use of water. It would also increase 
the reliability of supply for a growing hydroelectric industry. However, although this transaction 
allowed the government to succeed in securing a potential expansion for hydroelectric 
generation, it failed to accurately assess environmental and social impact at the local level. 
The privatization of Cañón del Pato, especially the resulting local water management regime, 
has been very controversial to local and regional actors for several reasons. First of all, the 
decision to privatize the lake, which is located entirely within Huascarán National Park (Figure 
1), puts in question officials’ judgment and the government’s credibility. Locals frequently refer 
to this event raising environmental justice questions such as: What did this imply for downstream 
populations that solely rely on this water for their livelihoods? Second, the license required 
Egenor to consult the local water administration before changing the lake’s discharge flows. 
However, communications and decisions regarding the lake’s use and management completely 
ignored the needs of local community members and farmers. Thus, while the one and only local 
                         
45  In 1996, Dominon Energy acquired 60% of Egenor. In 1999 Duke Energy purchased 90% of Dominon Energy and between 
2001 and 2005 an additional 10% was bought. Currently, Duke energy owns 99.9% of Egenor (Duke Energy, 2010).  
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water supply system was scheduled to drastically change, the community’s voice was silenced by 
the newly imposed water governance structure. Finally, since the water authority failed to be 
transparent about the process of providing the company with a water license and about its 
enforcement, stories about how water was managed under private hands and its effects on the 
local environment began to spread across the community and generating animosity against public 
servants. Community members, backed by local leaders and technical experts in the area -
including a former worker of Egenor - argue that the local water administration gave a license to 
release water at a rate that surpassed maximum rates recommended by experts.46 In addition, 
they argue that once the license was given, the local water administration failed to oversee the 
lake’s water management. As this was the case, Egenor failed to abide by the license, releasing 
water at a flow that surpassed the maximum allowed by the license by a factor of two47 (Personal 
communication, irrigator and community leader, June 16, 2010). From 1996 until 2008, local 
water users and Duke Energy engaged in a series of discussions over adequate water release 
quotas. However, even though some changes were implemented as a result of continuous 
complaints,48 fieldwork indicates that locals feel that despite their efforts their claims have been 
largely ignored by the authorities.  
                         
46 According to local experts and Duke Energy technicians, the local water administration gave a license of 5.5 m3/s. Local 
experts claim that this license failed to follow the recommendations made at the time the drainage tunnel was built, which 
suggested a flow no greater than 4.0 m3/s for the conservation of downstream biodiversity (Personal communication, engineer 
and former employee of Duke Energy, 12 June, 2010). 
47  Local technical experts argue that flows were as high as 8m3/s. 
48 In 1994 Administrative resolution n˚ 026-94-RCH/DR.AG-DRH/AT provides Electroperu with a license to release up to 8m3/s 
from Lake Parón. In 1996, after the privatization of Electroperu, resolution Nº 025-96-RCH/DR.AGDRH/AT approves the 
concession’s transfer from Electroperu to Egenor, continuing to allow for a water release of up to 8m3/s. Additionally, mandating 
that Egenor conducts an environmental impact study for Lake Parón. In 2006, after continuous complaints from local water users, 
Administrative Resolution N° 044-2006/AG.DR-Ancash/Drs./AT authorizes Duke Energy to release up to 5.5m3/s. In 2007, after 
Caráz’s major, in representation of the local water users coalition, requested the Autonomous Authority of the Santa Watershed 
(contemporary maximum authority in charge of the watershed’s development governance) to suspend Duke’s license. As a 
consequence, notification Nº 0257-2007- DR.AG.Ancash/Drs./AT limits Duke Energy’s maximum release to only 2.63m3/s 
(Untiveros, 2010). To this, local water administration from downstream CHAVIMOCHIC complained given the impact to the 
agricultural production in that area, and Duke appealed to the specialized civil court in Lima, being able to achieve the 
cancelation of the previous notification. In 2008, the lake was occupied by force by local water users (Defensoría del Pueblo, 
2009a). To this day, they manage the lake water releases. 
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Throughout the years, the use of Parón waters for electricity generation has been challenging 
for downstream user groups. Water needs of farmers and domestic users are almost opposite to 
those of the hydroelectric company. Both the quantity and timing at which water is needed have 
proven to be the major causes for disagreement. Whereas Egenor, in order to meet peak 
electricity demand in the urban centers, uses most water late in the evening, farmers, following 
the traditional work and irrigation schedule, use it throughout the day. The particular timing in 
which each farmer uses water depends on their location. Those who are further away from the 
water stream usually irrigate later in the day. With Duke controlling the water, irrigators found 
themselves having insufficient water for most of the day and too much of it for a few hours in the 
evening. With such a flow pattern, it was virtually impossible for all farmers to access enough 
water. Additionally, Duke’s water management pattern that responds to needs that require 
substantial amounts of water for only a few hours, has proven harmful to local farmers and 
domestic users. It has damaged Caráz’s water treatment facility of EPS Chavin (Untiveros, 
2010), reduced the drinking water supply for the town of Caráz (Personal communication, 
irrigator and community leader, June 3, 2010), and damaged irrigation canals and crop 
production of downstream farmers (Peralta, 2010). As an interviewee explained  “while 
sometimes they [Egenor] released too much water causing erosion, ruining the irrigation canals, 
flooding the fields, and damaging the quality of drinking water, other times they refused to 
discharge any water for days at a time ruining most crops” (Personal communication, irrigator 
and community leader, June 16, 2010).  
The privatization of this hydroelectric plant is only one of many cases in which the 
government, in its pursuit of macroeconomic development, has sacrificed social equity.49 This 
                         
49 I emphasize “macro-economy” because by targeting the improvement of country-wide indicators, the government has been 
successful at increasing foreign investment; however, this economic growth is translated as unequal development throughout the 
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case perfectly exemplifies how larger governance systems, in their aim for efficiency, unevenly 
distribute costs and benefits of development. Citizens in the rural Andes often bear the costs for 
benefits to be enjoyed in the urban coast, without having a say in the matter. In this specific case, 
throughout almost ten years, locals have been institutionally silenced by not having a role in their 
water governance. In addition, since 1996, their access to water has been continuously sacrificed 
to secure a reliable supply for an increasing electricity demand in the country. The use of Parón’s 
water for electricity generation has caused a severe strain on the surrounding communities. Since 
most households survive only from farming, Egenor’s water regime has rendered their 
livelihoods vulnerable.  
In addition, this privatization has had severe impacts on the quality of relations among local 
irrigators and on those between PL residents and the government. The imposed water governance 
arrangements had serious implications on the relationships between and among stakeholder 
groups. First of all, the local bonds of trust and reciprocity that inhere in social relations were 
critically harmed. Having access to less than optimal amounts of water, local irrigators began 
arguing over each other’s water use and distrusting their neighbors. Secondly, the lack of 
transparency and accountability from the government’s part only aggravated their image in PL 
watershed. Locals perceived the government’s agreements with Egenor as disregarding their 
livelihoods. Thus, rather than being seen as a support, the government was perceived as an 
enemy that placed their livelihoods at risk. Finally, relations between the community and the 
hydroelectric company deteriorated sharply. Throughout this time, even though there were no 
direct confrontations between the community and the company, the conflict was escalating under 
the surface, sides were forming and positions were becoming rigid, and the more time passed, the 
                                                                               
country. 
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stronger the community’s resentment toward Egenor grew.  
In this context PL water users have found themselves in a conflict that has grown to be far 
more convoluted than they were prepared for. In July 2008, as irrigators from the campesino 
community Cruz de Mayo, and from Caráz lost their patience with unattended claims to the 
government, they blocked access to the lake and re-claimed it as theirs (Defensoría del Pueblo, 
2009a). For almost three years access to the lake has been blocked. While Egenor representatives 
are strictly forbidden from coming to the area, public officials’ entrance is closely monitored. 
Throughout this time, the conflict evolved from being a local discussion on water use and access, 
to a multifaceted regional and national disagreement that elucidated equity concerns in Peruvian 
water governance, and that began questioning the previously unproblematized link between 
water management practices and the risk of natural hazards in the area.50  
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE LAKE’S SEIZING  
 
Drawing from interviews, newspaper articles and video clips, it appears that once local 
leaders had control of the lake, the community became more cohesive and prouder of their 
identity than ever. “Residents were now conscious of the situation, it was as if only then, 
everyone [in the community] realized that they too have a right to secure water access and should 
have a voice in their water governance” (Personal communication, social scientist, June 24, 
2010). While initially the event generated cohesion amongst local residents, this passion and 
excitement was quickly politicized. Residents from different socio-demographic backgrounds in 
the surrounding areas, all of the sudden, were eager to voice their opinions. In August 2008, less 
than two months after the lake was seized, the communities in PL came together and participated 
in a public demonstration in Caráz. Women from Cruz de Mayo, and school children from Caráz 
                         
50  Ever since the 1940s the Peruvian government’s approach to disaster prevention in the Cordillera Blanca has consisted of 
draining and damming glacial lakes, an effort that since the 1950s has been explicitly guided by development efforts. For more 
information see Carey, 2008. 
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and Campiña marched on the streets to repeating: “Parón is not for sale, Parón should be 
defended!”(see Figure10 and Figure11).  
A discourse equating the lake’s water to life, and the maintenance of its governance 
arrangement to the community’s survival, appeared throughout Caráz, Campiña, and Cruz de 
Mayo. First, political speeches that suggested that the survival of the recently established water 
governance arrangement relied on people’s willingness to fight for it were aired on the radio and 
published on local newspapers articles. Subsequently, this political rhetoric began spreading 
through the public. Residents went on the streets and marched to support and reinforce the 
message. Cruz de Mayo, Caráz, and Campiña were united against their oppressors. Judging from 
how protests went protests, it appeared that they were willing to do anything to defend their 
water.51  
 
Figure 10: School children from Caráz and Campiña  protesting against water governance of 
Parón  (9/11/08). Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSFwrPrMzGQ 
While seizing the lake raised awareness about water rights and governance, generated 
                         
51  Demonstrations were charged with strong sentiments. The sense of urgency that was spreading reinforced the need to defend 
Parón’s water. This is clearly represented by the words captured on a video recording from a high school student during a public 
protest: “If possible, I will give my life to every drop of Parón’s water” (Salvemos Parón , 2008). 
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communal cohesion, and fostered local civil unrest against the previously imposed water 
governance structure, the reaction at the regional and national level was quite different. Soon 
after locals occupied the lake, the conflict grabbed the attention of high officials in Huaráz and 
Lima. Authorities in Lima reacted by holding a series of negotiations that included the 
participation of local and national government officials. However, since the negotiations 
excluded representatives from the local community, negotiators were unable to find a fix to this 
problem. Officials in Lima assumed that the local voice was fairly represented by the 
municipality. The mayor was present in all discussions, negotiating with congressmen and high 
representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of the Environment, and the Ministry 
of Energy and Mines. While he was gaining recognition and power through this conflict, local 
irrigators, even though one of the most important stakeholder groups in this conflict, continued to 
be excluded from the decision making process.52  
 
Figure 11: Indigenous women from Cruz de Mayo protesting against water regime in 
Parón . Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tjO6R0AtOhk 
Reacting to their marginalization and the pressing need to secure a safe management of the 
                         
52 Rather than not being invited to the negotiation process, local water users were excluded because the negotiations took place in 
Lima instead of Caráz. This made it impossible for irrigator representatives to attend.  
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lake, Cruz de Mayo asked the authorities to call a meeting to transfer the lake’s management to a 
multi-sectoral administration commission. The campesino community also requested to be 
included as a separate party in the negotiations. It is in this context that the negotiations between 
stakeholders in this conflict began. However, before addressing the negotiations, to provide 
context to the discussion, the following section will introduce the stakeholders. 
STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 
This section introduces the main actors, their positions, underlying interests, and strengths 
and weaknesses. While I examine each stakeholder in detail, I connect perceptions, and attitudes 
to broader spatio-temporal dynamics. In addition, as a segway to the subsequent negotiation 
discussion, this section brings to light the stark differences between stakeholders, why the lack of 
trust is so prominent, how parties have used their sources of power, and how the roles and 
behaviors taken by each party have deterred the negotiation process and thus aggravated 
vulnerability in the area.  
a. CRUZ DE MAYO 
Cruz de Mayo is an indigenous community located in the upper PL watershed. With 
approximately 800 households, this community has its own government53 (Carey et al., 2012). It 
is governed by a board, and each of its 14 sectors is represented by a delegate who works closely 
with the board (Personal communication, Cruz de Mayo community member, August 6, 2011). 
According to non-profit representatives working closely with Cruz de Mayo, this community is 
especially organized, highly cohesive, and very respectful of its internal hierarchies (Personal 
communication, social scientist, June 24, 2010). The large majority of its residents rely on 
subsistence farming. Because their community is located at a higher altitude and secluded from 
                         
53 Cruz de Mayo leaders describe comuneros as those who belong to the community and have been actively involved in 
communal work for several years. Thus, given that the majority of these are registered and represent their families, community 
leaders interviewed estimate that Cruz de Mayo is populated by 800 approximately households. 
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larger urban centers (Figure 12), their standards of living are drastically lower, and their sources 
of livelihood are very limited.  
Throughout the conflict, representatives of Cruz de Mayo have had one main interest; to 
secure their livelihood. According to social scientists working in the area, this community lives 
in extreme poverty, and their residents’ sole livelihood source depends on their secure access to 
water (Personal communication, local non-profit worker, June 7, 2010). Hence, Cruz de Mayo 
fiercely opposes the inclusion of Duke to the local water governance. In addition, given that in 
2010 PNH created a tourism development plan for this area (Personal communication, PNH 
reprentative, August 1, 2011), the community hopes to increase their local tourism-derived 
income, and to diversify their livelihood sources. As such, they hope that the new management 
regime will increase the lake’s water volume in order to improve the aesthetic appeal of the lake.  
In addition, Cruz de Mayo has approached this conflict with another, less pressing but 
equally important interest; to have a voice (Hirschman, 1970). In Parón, as in the rest of Peru, 
indigenous populations have long been marginalized and silenced. Through this process, given 
that they already have a firm leadership and organizational structure, Cruz de Mayo is further 
solidifying as a community. They are realizing that they too have a voice, and that they too 
should be heard. Thus, this conflict has helped Cruz de Mayo develop the confidence it needed to 
better interact with other communities and the government. 
Cruz de Mayo’s metamorphosis is taking place partially because their leaders have been 
working closely with CEAS - a religious organization that aims to defend and promote human 
rights (CEAS, 2011). This religious institution has been involved in the conflict since the very 
beginning. Their support consists of legal advice and representation during meetings, as well as 
providing advice to develop a strategy to negotiate. It has also proven extremely useful because 
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the organization’s representatives have helped the community to ‘work the system’. Although 
critics have compared the relationship between CEAS and Cruz de Mayo to one between a 
puppet master and its ‘puppet’, it appears that CEAS has been extremely helpful in making Cruz 
de Mayo use their assets on the negotiations.  
b. CAMPIÑA  
Campiña is the agricultural area surrounding Caráz. Even though politically it is considered a 
part of Caráz, given that residents in this area have a different livelihood basis (agriculture), 
locals refer to it as a different community. Agriculture in this area is mainly commercialized 
locally and regionally. In very few cases it is exported (Personal communication, ALA 
representative, June 14, 2010). Even though residents from this area are significantly wealthier 
than in Cruz de Mayo, research indicates that many of the farmers find themselves being forced 
to move to the town of Caráz in search of a more reliable income than agriculture can provide.  
Water users from Campiña seem more divided and suspicious than any other user groups. 
Moreover, as it appears that there are no formal channels of communication between users and 
their leaders, users lack sufficient information to determine how the conflict and negotiations are 
affecting them. However, regardless of this lack of unity, because they all hope to continue 
working on agriculture, and since their access to water was rendered vulnerable when Egenor 
was in charge of the Lake, there is strong agreement on the need to reject Egenor from the area. 
Additionally, much like Cruz de Mayo, they also agree on the importance of being able to 
diversify their livelihoods with the emergence of tourism (Personal communication, irrigator and 
community leader, August 7, 2011).  
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Figure 12: Parón-Llullán watershed. Source: Altamirano, 2012 
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As Campiña residents are more connected to the national society than those who live in Cruz 
de Mayo, they are more aware of the uneven distribution of public services. Hence, it appears 
that the resulting economic and social dynamics between Andean and Coastal Peru, have led to 
their perception of having their voice silenced, and hence, their resentment and skepticism of the 
national government. Even though Campiña residents have better access to education, services, 
and livelihood diversification, their lack of unity, their increasing suspicion even of members of 
their own community, and their lack of a solid, institutionalized leadership is rendering this party 
one of the most vulnerable ones. 
c. MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT OF HUAYLAS54 
The local government has been represented by the same official for two terms now. His 
political success mainly draws from his role in this conflict. From day one, the mayor has been a 
strong advocate for the community. In fact, he has made several bold public statements such as, 
“la lucha será hasta las últimas consecuencias”, or “the fight will continue until the final 
consequences”, where he alludes that he is willing to suffer whatever consequences to endorse 
the community all the way  (Montoro, 2011). Thus, one could argue that his strategy for 
maintaining political power has been to side with the community in regards to the Lake’s 
management. In addition, as he hopes to add successful projects to his lists of accomplishments, 
his support of tourism development, and of the improvement of the lake’s aesthetic value by 
increasing its volume, is decisive.  
However, in pursuing his interest in gaining popularity throughout the community, the mayor 
has sacrificed his relations with the regional and national authorities. For instance, backing up 
the local parties, he has made public pronunciations in which he blamed the Ministry of 
Agriculture and ANA for starting the conflict (El Inca, 2011). Occurrences such as this elucidate 
                         
54 Huaylas is the province where Caráz, Campiña, and Cruz de Mayo are located. 
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how parties not only distrust, but also dislike each other, creating a dynamic that makes a 
resolution to this conflict more challenging.   
d. THE NATIONAL WATER AUTHORITY 
ANA is a newly formed government agency that is in charge of all water use and distribution 
throughout Peru. This agency was created in 2008, and among its urgent organizational goals is 
to implement the new Water Resources Law, a legislation that introduces a nationwide regime 
which is based on IWRM. The idea behind the legislation is that by fostering multi-sectorial 
negotiation of water and giving voice to all stakeholders, the new regime will balance economic 
efficiency, environmental sustainability, and social equity in the face of water stress (Autoridad 
Nacional del Agua, 2009b).  
Ironically, throughout this conflict it appears as if this organization has failed to support its 
mission. While ANA should have taken the lead to advance negotiations, many argue that in its 
interest to steer away from political controversy, instead, they have hampered negotiations. 
Critics argue that they have failed to show up to some meetings, and that their position 
throughout the negotiation has been inconsistent because they constantly change the 
representative they send to negotiate. This lack of efficiency has been received with suspicion in 
the community. Many believe that ANA is purposely delaying negotiations so that in the end, the 
lake’s management would have to be given back to Duke. Since the lake’s water management 
requires expertise and financial resources, it would only be logical that ANA would support 
Egenor’s involvement as a main actor; this company has both the expertise and financial 
resources that no other party can provide.  
ANA appears to have two contradictory interests; while it aims to implement the 2009 
legislation – which implies the formation of a multi-stakeholder committee for water 
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management purposes – it also hopes to find a quick fix to the conflict, which implies that 
Duke’s representatives would have a leading role in the committee. However, unless the social 
problems behind this conflict are addressed, Duke will not be able to be a part of this new 
governance structure, and ANA will not be able to implement the legislation properly. With this 
in mind, it is fair to say that ANA, in its role as a leader, has put off a resolution by setting a 
double agenda for the meetings. 
e. THE LOCAL WATER ADMINISTRATION 
The ALA is the water authority’s representative at local level. Their main responsibility is to 
provide water licenses and to ensure that all decisions at the local level are compatible with the 
decisions made at the national level. In PL, ALA is the party that is mostly blamed for starting 
the conflict. According to critics, this organization not only gave Egenor a license to release 
excessively high volumes of water, but also failed to oversee the license’s compliance. Hence, to 
them, because ALA tried to evade problems with Duke Energy, it failed to establish its authority. 
Most important, it failed to take farmers’ complaints seriously, generating the frustration that 
rapidly spread throughout the community. 
Perception plays a big role in a conflict like this one. Often times, ALA gets blamed for 
plotting against the community. Locals repeatedly complained that while ALA pushes 
aggressively for the implementation of the new water law, its functionaries fail to educate water 
users on details of the legislation such as: changes from the previous law, specific requirements 
from irrigators, or the legislation’s effects on users’ access to water. Given their past relationship 
with ALA, locals interpret this combination of persuasiveness and secrecy as a plot to change 
their water uses, and to render their rights vulnerable. The organization, however, dismissed 
these accusations, and explained that given their time and resource pressures, they are limited to 
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having to ‘act fast’ while giving a slow training.55  
f. UNIDAD DE GLACIOLOGÍA Y RECURSOS HÍDRICOS 
Glaciología is the national institution in charge of evaluating and monitoring the behavior of 
glaciers and glacial lakes to prevent and mitigate the risk of natural disasters (Autoridad 
Nacional del Agua, 2009c). This agency works under ANA but has held a significantly different 
role, position, and interests throughout the conflict. In fact, this party exemplifies the importance 
of the role of the negotiator in shaping the negotiation’s outcome. 
Unlike the other government representatives, Glaciología’s delegate seems genuinely 
concerned about the community’s wellbeing. One of his main interests is to ensure a fair 
procedure, and that all parties understand the process and decisions. Glaciología plays a central 
role in this conflict because, since its leadership has been better able to gain the community’s 
trust, the organization functions as a nexus of communication between Water Authority agencies 
and the local parties. In addition, given that Glaciología is a scientifically based organization, 
and its recommendations are based on research, it could be argued that this governmental 
institution has a better the capacity to arrive to a consensus with the community and much better 
chances to mitigate the latent risk of GLOF in the area.  
g. PARQUE NACIONAL DE HUASCARÁN 
PNH, was created in 1975, and declared a natural patrimony of humanity by UNESCO in 
1985 (UNESCO, 2007). The rugged terrain of PHN comprises sections of both the Cordillera 
Blanca and Cordillera Negra (Figure 1). Within the park’s territory there are four campesino 
communities, and within its buffer zone there are dozens more56 (Personal communication, PNH 
                         
55 Peru was supported by the World Bank to begin implementing the new legislation. Thus, since it is required to show progress 
ALA appears to be pressed to aggressively formalize people’s water right. While the government aims to have a better account of 
the water demand versus supply, residents are afraid that by having their rights formalized their access will be changed, and that 
their water rights will be made vulnerable for a more ‘efficient’ water use. 
56 The buffer zone, or transition zone, is the area surrounding the park, where park officials attempt to minimize human impact on 
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representative, June 3, 2010). Thus, ever since PNH was crated, park officials have been 
balancing biodiversity conservation and community development.  Throughout its existence, the 
park has aimed to diversify livelihoods through tourism, and to demonstrate to community 
member that they can benefit from taking care of the environment.  
With this in mind, park officials’ interests are somewhat different from those of the other 
parties. While they are neutral as to how the new governance arrangement in Parón is designed, 
their main interest is that the water management regime considers the preservation of 
biodiversity. Additionally, PNH is interested in developing the tourism industry in this area. In 
fact, park officials and community leaders are already having talks to develop a business plan.57 
Thus, in order to successfully develop the tourism industry, it is in PNH’s interest that those who 
manage the lake’s waters increase its volume to bring out its aesthetic value. However, as a 
government agency, it is also accountable to the public in the case of a natural disaster; thus, they 
also oppose keeping the water level too high. All in all, PNH is choosing to stay silent, and even 
appears uninterested in this conflict. PNH officials could be of great help to this conflict. They 
share interests with the community and have an affiliation with the national government. 
Potentially, they could serve as a liaison between the government and the community. However, 
based on fieldwork their contribution to the conflict negotiations has been minimal. 
h. DUKE ENERGY / EGENOR 
Egenor is the subsidiary of Duke Energy in charge of operating Cañón del Pato. This 
multinational company entered the area when the government privatized Electroperu (see 
Chapter Two). When acquiring Cañón del Pato, the company also became the owner of lake 
                                                                               
conservation areas and where they help address the socio-economic needs of the nearby population. 
57 Ideally, with the development of tourism, community members will be able to benefit in a few ways. Cruz de Mayo, in 
addition to profiting from selling food or lodging, they would get a percent of the profit earned entrance fees. Campiña and Caráz 
residents would ideally provide related services such as tour guides or restaurants.  
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Parón’s infrastructure. ALA provided Egenor with a license to use the lake’s water. Since then, 
Egenor, in its interest to have access to extra water when needed, has invested millions of dollars 
to acquire and maintain the lake’s drainage tunnel. However, today, the conflict, unpredictable 
precipitation patterns, and a reduction of total rainfall in the area, have caused the company to 
experience a significant revenue loss (Personal communication, Duke Energy representative, 
August 5, 2011). 
When interviewed Egenor representatives acknowledged past mistakes and recognized that 
repairing or re-starting relations with the community is an important first step, a step that will 
take a long time to take. Currently, Egenor is making attempts to re-connect with Cruz de Mayo; 
however, this effort is doing nothing but creating disputes within the community (Personal 
communication, Cruz de Mayo community member, August 6, 2011). While Egenor officials 
hope to recover their access to Parón’s water, they realize that this might not happen. If they 
decide to give up trying with the community, they will demand a refund from the state for all the 
money invested on maintaining and improving the lake’s infrastructure.  
NEGOTIATIONS OVER GOVERNANCE: WATER ACCESS AND SAFETY  
 
While throughout this time the overarching goal of negotiations has been the determination 
of a new water governance structure that would secure the different parties’ water rights and 
mitigate the risk to natural disasters, individual negotiations have aimed to address several 
relevant sub-issues. The issues debated that are most germane to this thesis are: First, Egenor’s 
legal property rights to the lake. Once stakeholders began discussing the problem openly, the 
first issue to be questioned was the appropriateness of having a water body - that is located in its 
entirety within a national park, and that serves as the only water source for a significant portion 
of the local population - as private property. Second, the formation of a multi-sectoral water 
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governance structure that will fairly represent all stakeholders’ interests and that will secure the 
different parties’ access to water. Throughout the conflict, stakeholders have shown interest, but 
thus far have failed at forming such a governance body. This effort has proven significantly more 
challenging than stakeholders were anticipating. Challenges have appeared in a plethora of ways, 
including the determination of participants and parties, the financing of the lake’s operation by 
different constituencies, the ability of parties to negotiate without trust, and the almost 
contradictory outcomes envisioned by all parties. Third, the determination of a water 
management regime that would mitigate the risk to natural hazards. While the government 
argued for the lake to stay at a certain level, the community - distrusting the government’s real 
intent, disbelieving the actual risk of a natural hazard, and wanting to diversify their livelihood 
strategies - argued for a higher level, one that in the government’s eye would pose a risk of 
GLOF. These three issues are  discussed in turn, below.   
Property Rights of the Lake 
During the concession transfer from Electroperu to Duke, the lake’s legal property was 
reassigned to the private entity (Untiveros, 2010). Given that the lake is entirely within the 
national park, and that residents have long questioned the government’s decision to ‘privatize’ 
this water body, the first topic to be discussed was Duke’s legal property rights to the lake.58 The 
company defended its right to manage Parón’s water releases emphasizing its legal right to 
operate the lake, and its multi-million dollar investment for the maintenance and improvement of 
the drainage tunnel (Figure 13). Duke representatives also pointed out the company’s unique 
position of having the capacity and expertise required to operate and maintain the infrastructure, 
                         
58 According to Supreme Decree N° 002-2010-MINAM, in July 1993, it was authorized to the Dirección Nacional de Registros 
Públicos y Civiles, or National Direction of Public and Civil Registries, of the Ministry of Justice to inscribe Electroperu’s estate. 
With this, Electroperu provisionally inscribed dominion over the property of 540 Ha that included lake Parón. When Electroperu 
was privatized, Duke Energy became the registered holder of the dominion.  
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and to secure downstream residents from natural disasters. Locals, on the other hand, formed a 
“commission for the recuperation of lake Parón” to claim national government agencies to 
rectify the framing of property rights of the lake (Untiveros, 2010).  
In response to local, regional, and national pressure, the government’s water authority was 
able to use legal technicalities found in the lake’s registry in order to return to the government.59 
Consequently, in February 2010 the National Water Authority (ANA) declared Lake Parón as 
National Patrimony. With this, Duke Energy’s legal title to the lake was revoked; however, this, 
by no means, meant that Egenor would disappear from PL. After all, the lake’s drainage tunnel 
and its machinery still belonged to the company, and, even though Egenor did not have the right 
to manage the lake anymore, it still had legal access to Parón ’s waters and was entitled to be a 
part of the resource management negotiations.  
The revocation of the Lake’s property rights from Egenor was a major leap forward for 
securing the local water rights; However, this did not mean that the community would enjoy 
secure water rights. Instead, it meant that local user groups would have to target their efforts to 
determining a water governance structure that would secure their rights while mitigating their 
risk to natural disasters.  
A Just Governance Structure 
The conflict’s negotiations were for the most part about achieving justice. Fieldwork 
indicates that party representatives were concerned about securing justice for their own 
constituencies. Justice, as an outcome of the negotiations would imply the creation of a 
governance structure that distributes water equitably, and that provides equitable representation 
                         
59 According to Supreme Decree N° 002-2010-MINAM, while Electroperu provisionally inscribed dominion over lake Parón, it 
failed to do request its permanent inscription.  
71 
 
 
of different stakeholder interests during decision making processes. However, the lake’s 
governance has proven to be one of the biggest challenges to the resolution of this conflict. Even 
though parties agree that there is an urgent need to establish a such a governance body, this task 
has proven to be more challenging than they were expecting. As a result, to this day, a multi-
sectoral governance team still has yet to be put in place. Consequently, for over three years now 
local irrigators have controlled the lake; which paradoxically secures the community’s access to 
water, while increasing PL risk to natural disasters. 
  
Figure 13: Lake Parón 's Drainage tunnel.  
Source: http://www.ana.gob.pe/media/447119/estado_situacional_laguna_Parón .[1].pdf 
 
Thus far, parties have not been able to create a governance team because there are many 
issues that resulted from the conflict that prevent any type of agreement. First of all, the 
government’s lack of transparency has raised suspicion amongst community members. For 
instance, in 2010 state agencies in Lima declared Parón to be in state of emergency, and 
mandated the creation of an Operations Committee.60 This team was responsible for planning 
                         
60 According to Legal Resolution N°. 737-2011-ANA this committee was to be lead by ALA and composed of the following 
members: a representative of PNH, the major of Caráz, the president of campesino community Cruz de Mayo, the president of 
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and overseeing water use based on its availability. Even though all affected parties were present 
and representatives were all decision makers, the committee failed to arrive at any agreement. 
According to local user-group’s representatives, while a plan was being drafted by negotiators in 
Caráz, a different one was drafted by ANA in Lima. Representatives argue that to them, the 
meetings, and even the work they did, seemed like a gimmick. A disgruntled negotiator once told 
me “people from Lima come here to trick us. They bring already-made minutes and they want us 
to sign them” (Personal communication, local engineer, August 3, 2010).  
Second, while community representatives accuse the water authority of approaching the 
negotiation table with preconceived outcomes, they do exactly the same thing. For instance, 
before the lake was seized the local population demanded that the lake be governed by a multi-
sectoral committee; however, they also requested that the committee release water at a specific 
volume (one that only met the community’s interests). This example is important because it 
shows how parties are incapable of perceiving their own contribution to the conflict’s escalation. 
Most importantly, however, it shows how the different parties approach the negotiation with 
preconceived, and sometimes opposing, expectations of what the multi-stakeholder governance 
team will do for them.  
Finally, the biggest challenge to the creation of a just governance structure is the lack of  
strong leadership and representation in participating parties. In a time like this, it is crucial that 
parties have a strong leadership to be able to accurately represent their constituencies. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Parón. The responsibility of managing the lake and 
of having to acquire funds for it has been detrimental to the cohesion of local groups. For 
instance, water users in Campiña are often excluded from decisions regarding the lake’s 
                                                                               
the irrigator’s commission, and a representative of non-agrarian users. 
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governance. This information gap is then filled by false reports from the media, generating 
suspicion among users. Consequently, when leaders approach water users requesting financial 
contributions for the lake’s management, they face resistance from users. Now, not only is 
Campiña  weakening as a group because users feel like they are being abused by their leaders, 
but also Cruz de Mayo users now view Campiña  as not fully committed to their cause. In this 
context, where there is a lack of transparency and where trust is weakening within parties and 
allies, it will be challenging for groups to be able to secure their access to water. 
A governance structure that is just, that all parties trust, that makes them feel represented, and 
that ultimately secures the different parties’ water access will not be created until the previously 
mentioned issues are dealt with. Institutional processes need to become more transparent, 
leadership needs to incentivize rather than deter group cohesion, and negotiating parties need to 
begin creating common views on what multi-party governance outcomes will do for them. Until 
then, it appears that the community (with occasional government interventions) will continue to 
control the lake. While this arrangement secures the community’s access to water, it also 
deprives Duke from their water rights. 
Water Management: “Safety vs. Equity” 
The lake’s occupation was a source of great concern to authorities in Huaráz and Lima, as 
they assumed that irrigators’ water management would prioritize irrigation and tourism 
development needs over safety to natural disasters.61 This area is well known for its high risk of 
GLOF. In the 1970, the neighboring town of Yungay was completely buried by a landslide, 
killing almost 20,000 people (Instituto Geofísico del Peru, 2009). Soon after the lake was seized, 
                         
61 Locals argued that the lake’s water level should be kept higher than the security level recommended by glaciologists. The logic 
was that the higher the lake’s water level, the greater its aesthetic value. With a more beautiful lake, more tourists will visit the 
area. With this scenario local will have the opportunity to diversify their livelihood. 
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with the permission and participation of community members, authorities from Lima visited 
Parón several times. Their goal was to assess the risk of a lack of maintenance of the lake’s 
infrastructure (see Figure 13), to monitor the water’s level, and to determine the proper water 
release volume. Since then the government and community have engaged in a series of debates 
over achieving an enhanced water management regime, one that will simultaneously consider the 
water needs of user groups and the mitigation of risks of GLOF.  
Aiming to reduce the risk of hazards in the area, during the negotiations the government has 
issued a state of emergency for Lake Parón twice. This status authorized them to operate the lake 
for a set period of time. However, their entrance to the lake and the implementation of what the 
government perceives as a safe water management practice has been no easy task. Past 
experiences with the government where ‘risk mitigation’ was used to empower other parties to 
govern water, and ultimately to make their water rights vulnerable have proven key in creating 
the obstacles that the government is facing today. The community’s distrust in the authorities, 
their fear of losing access to water, and their reluctance to believe the actual presence of a risk 
appeared to be the biggest challenges to implement a water management regime that proves safe 
to nearby residents.62  
FROZEN NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Before the lake’s seizing, community residents were looking to negotiate their water use and 
access. However, once they held control of the lake, having the upper hand, they decisively 
refused to negotiate with Egenor representatives (Personal communication, local non-profit 
worker, June 7 2010). Once again, this conflict shifted in May 2011. The Constitutional Court 
                         
62 This fear reigns in the community to this day, and at the time, it was aggravated by the newly emergent discourse that equates 
water to life. Consequently, most residents either regarded scientific warnings as false- especially if they came from the 
government - or prioritized their access to water over their security. This is well represented by the phrase often repeated by 
locals: ‘I would rather die in an avalanche than of thirst’ (Field notes, 2010). 
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published resolution EXP no 00834—2010-PA/TC, which mandated that the water authority 
evict the community from the lake, and return the control of its infrastructure to Egenor63  
(Tribunal Constitucional, 2011).  This event has frozen all attempts to negotiate because, on the 
one hand, it has further aggravated the community’s distrust in the government. On the other 
hand, it appears to have given some government officials the excuse to escape their 
responsibilities, since it is expected that a different government agency will solve the conflict.64 
The lake’s management is still under the community’s responsibility, but since the resolution the 
situation has changed. The community is less open to negotiate with the government and its 
members are psychologically prepared for ‘whatever comes’ (Personal communication, local 
government representative, August 11, 2011). According to interviews, neither the government 
nor Egenor will use force to enter the lake. Thus, it appears that this resolution not only has had 
the opposite effect to its original intention. Rather than securing Egenor’s water rights, they have 
been rendered more vulnerable. Also by causing all negotiations to freeze, it has further instilled 
the lake’s management responsibility on the community, and consequentially increased the risk 
of natural hazards in the area. 
In an effort to re-open negotiations and attract more media attention to this case, the CEAS, 
which has been assisting Cruz de Mayo throughout this process, has reached out to important 
political figures. Among those who received a plea was the first lady of Peru. In September 
2011, she, pointing to ANA’s inefficiency, requested the Ministry of Energy and Mines to 
accelerate the creation of the Comité de Gestión,65 or management committee.66 This letter 
                         
63 In Peru the Constitutional Court is the organization with maximum authority to interpret and control the constitutionality. It 
guards that the legislations or acts of other governmental entities do not contradict the constitution.  
64 This attitude was apparent amongst most ANA and ALA functionaries who participated in this research. Even though these 
entities were directly responsible for enforcement of the resolution, it appeared that to these public servants, the problem’s 
solution was now a responsibility of the judge. 
65 Comité de Gestión is the multi-stakeholder committee that according to the 2009 water law is responsible for planning water 
use in each watershed. 
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grabbed attention from most prominent newspapers and TV channels in Peru (America TV, 
2011; Panamericana, 2011). Sadly, rather than exposing the environmental injustice in this case, 
most press coverage questioned the first lady’s authority for making such a request (El 
Comercio, 2011). Although some reports did point out the ecological dangers of the conflict, 
none addressed social justice issues. Regardless, the conflict is now being watched by politicians 
including the president and Prime Minister (Llontop Samillán, 2011).  
CONCLUSION 
 
The Parón water conflict provides important lessons that can be of great help to better 
manage future disagreements over water use and distribution. It is likely that Parón’s case 
represents only the beginning of a series of water conflicts to come in the country. Peru is prone 
to face an increasing number of water conflicts for several reasons. First, the country faces 
imminent water scarcity challenges. Second, as this thesis argues, there are no mechanisms to 
support an equitable sharing of water among competing users. Finally, the central government is 
now beginning to implement its new de-centralized water governance structure that while 
providing a channel for disenfranchised users to have a voice in advising, it continues to direct 
important decisions to authorities in Lima. This decision making process increases the chances 
that disagreements of this nature will ignite since the central government buttresses neoliberal 
policies that favor ‘efficient’ water use in the coast.  
This conflict can useful to guide future water governance de-centralization efforts because it 
highlights those aspects of the implementation that have proven challenging to the Peruvian 
water authority. The lessons drawn from this case study are especially applicable to future 
implementation efforts throughout the Andes. Much like in Parón, Andean water users elsewhere 
                                                                               
66 http://www.scribd.com/doc/73067863/Carta-de-Nadine-Heredia-a-Carlos-Herrera-Descalzi, last accessed: 4/16/12. 
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in Peru have been marginalized for a long time (Gelles, 2000; Tradwick, 2003). As the 
government struggles to de-centralize the national water governance structure, Andean irrigators, 
filled with suspicion, resist governmental efforts. Irrigators in the highlands, especially 
indigenous farmers, fear that governmental efforts, in their aim to buttress economic 
development, will favor private interests and only render their access to water more vulnerable.  
In addition to providing lessons for future water governance issues, this conflict carries 
particular traits that will hardly repeat elsewhere in Peru. The Parón  water conflict appears to be 
unique and especially convoluted, because not only does it involve the usual political, social, 
economic, and cultural components that most socio-environmental conflicts have, but also it 
includes a risk and vulnerability factor. This particularity brings out important questions 
regarding the role of risk and vulnerability in shaping the conflict, and thus, influences important 
water management decisions.  
This conflict is unique because its risk and vulnerability aspects are unlikely to repeat 
elsewhere. These particular aspects have become intertwined with politics in many different 
ways. Even though there is a latent risk of outburst flood in the area, the way in which ‘risk 
management’ is being used to secure the interests of some, and how lightly is being taken by 
some others begs questions regarding both the role that vulnerability plays in shaping water 
governance and the role that the determination of a water governance body is playing in shaping 
vulnerability. The chapter that follows examines the relationship between water governance and 
vulnerability.  
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CHAPTER 4 
WATER VULNERABILITIES: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND DISASTERS 
IN PARÓN 
        
INTRODUCTION  
 
Throughout the escalation of Parón’s water governance conflict, multiple ideologies and 
discourses have appeared and disappeared, shaping perceptions, attitudes, and conversations 
between stakeholders. One such argument that particularly caught my attention pushed me to 
approach this case study in a different manner:  
‘Prefiero morir de una avalancha que de sed!’ or ‘I would rather die from an avalanche 
than of thirst!’  
During fieldwork, I heard this rhetoric countless times on the radio, TV, and even while 
conducting interviews. This phrase was being repeated continuously by enthusiastic PL 
residents, from community officials, to leaders, irrigators, students, and even local residents who 
weren’t directly related to the conflict. Although I realize that this rhetoric emerged as an 
ephemeral political tool in response to the government’s apparent threat to take away the lake’s 
water control, to me, it is fundamental because it brings to light a larger and more intricate 
connection between lake Parón’s water governance and PL residents’ vulnerability.  
Ever since the 1960s, when experts confirmed lake Parón as a hazardous environment, 
water governance decisions and processes have been closely tied to conversations of 
vulnerability and hazards67 (Carey, French, & O'Brien, 2012). According to local experts, the 
lake’s drainage tunnel construction was initiated to prevent a climate-related outburst flood 
(Personal communication, scientist and government representative, August 2, 2011). The 
reliance on this technology has had two opposite effects on the local vulnerability. On one hand, 
                         
67 For more information on the lake’s governance historical background refer to the ‘Water Conflict in Parón’ section in Chapter 
Three. 
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by allowing experts to control the lake’s water management, it has provided safety to local 
residents and mitigated their risk of GLOF. On another hand, allowing experts to operate the 
infrastructure has politicized the use, management, and regulation of water (Ioris, 2012; Mehta, 
2007). Hence, it has rendered the local population more vulnerable by limiting their water 
management decision-making power and ultimately jeopardized their access to the resource (see 
Chapter Three).   
In this chapter, my main goal is to provide a close examination of the ways in which 
water governance and vulnerability in Parón shape and re-shape each other. For this, I will use a 
political ecology (PE) approach combining literatures on water governance and vulnerability. 
Currently, political ecology of natural resources has made significant progress on water 
governance research. Geographers have successfully elucidated social justice implications of 
water governance institutions, organizations, and processes, including water privatization 
(Bakker, 2003; Budds, 2004), integrated water resources management, water technologies 
(Carey, French, & O'Brien, 2012; Jasanoff, 2003), and social struggles (Perreault, 2005). 
Similarly, they have made remarkable progress in vulnerability research. While some have 
advanced knowledge about impacts of a single environmental event and risk mitigation (Blaikie 
et al., 1994; Pelling, 2001), others have brought to light the human dimensions of vulnerability. 
In the process, they have uncovered the role played by political and economic powers, class 
conflict, and processes of marginalization in producing vulnerability (Bohle, 2001; Cutter, 2006; 
Fordham, 2004; Ribot & Peluso, 2003; Sultana, 2010).  
While geographers have made great advances in both environmental governance and 
vulnerability studies, these bodies of literature have been combined mostly to point out ways in 
which resource governance creates vulnerable conditions by distributing resources inequitably 
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(Lynch, 2012; Mehta, 2007;  & Peluso, 2003; Smucker & Wisner, 2008; Sultana, 2011). In this 
chapter, in addition to contributing to this argument, I bring to light how Parón’s water 
governance is also connected to vulnerability through the mitigation of natural disasters.   
I conceptualize governance and vulnerability as having a two-way relationship. While I 
understand the effects of water governance on vulnerability as channeled through water 
regulation and management decisions, I view the effects of vulnerability on water governance as 
mainly manifested on the ways in which discursive conceptualizations of vulnerability shape the 
determination of governance structures. In an agitated political environment, such as the one that 
gave birth to the conflict in PL, it was imperative to bring to light the way in which politics have: 
(1) mediated the use, management, and regulation of water; and (2) shaped, and been shaped by 
vulnerability and the risk of outburst flood in Parón.  
With this analysis, the links between vulnerability, water management, and water 
governance will also become evident. By water management I refer to the activity of planning, 
developing and distributing the resource for its use. By water governance I refer to the economic 
and political coordination that shape (1) institutional arrangements, political participation, and 
spatial scales by which decisions making with respect to water is made, and (2) the production of 
social order via the management of water. And by vulnerability I refer to the combination of the 
potential damage or loss of life from exposure to contingencies, the sensitivity of people, places, 
and ecosystems to the stress, and the capacity to recover from stress.  
Given Parón’s unique combination of socio-political and environmental settings, these 
links are of special importance to understand the complexities of the conflict and the ways in 
which the livelihoods of local residents depend on the conflict’s outcome. In this thesis, I 
understand water management as the fundamental connection between water governance and 
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vulnerability. However, far from arguing that Parón’s problem is one of water management, I 
suggest that while management lies on the surface, buried underneath is a much more convoluted 
governance struggle. This struggle that is grounded on the social and political instability in PL, 
engenders a fickle management regime that constantly drives PL residents into and out of 
vulnerability. As management teams continue changing, and water distribution regimes fluctuate 
according to the interests of those in charge, the vulnerability that nearby residents experience 
transforms. The management of Parón’s water makes nearby residents vulnerable primarily by 
increasing the risk of a glacial disaster and by making their access to water vulnerable. 
For this chapter’s analysis, I rely on the PE approach. In the first section, I undertake a 
review of this intellectual tradition to then explain the analytical framework I rely on for my 
assessment. I then use a brief review of research on vulnerability theory (Adger, 2006; Cutter, 
2006; Langridge, Christian-Smith, & Lohse, 2006; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008; Ribot, 2009; 
Wisner et al., 2004) to conceptualize vulnerability in a way that better suits my research question 
and case study’s context. In this section, I also provide an overview of environmental governance 
(Bridge & Perreault, 2009; Himley, 2008) and in particular water governance (Bakker, 2003; 
Budds & Hinojosa, 2012; Perreault, 2005). The section is followed by an analysis of the 
relationship between water governance and vulnerability. Borrowing from Budds and Hinojosa’s 
(2012) examination of the relation of water governance and mining in Peru, I apply their 
analytical lens to my case study and recognize the relation between water governance and 
vulnerability in Parón as embodied in, and expressed by, a range of ‘moments’. As such, I 
explore these ‘moments’, or instances: water flows and management, technology, institutions, 
discourses, and - given the particularities of Parón – negotiations, to bring to light the links 
between vulnerability and water governance. 
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VULNERABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE:  A POLITICAL ECOLOGY APPROACH 
 
PE is an approach to geography that analyzes the “complex relations between nature and 
society” (Watts, 2000, p. 257) by examining the politicization of nature through processes of 
development, environmental resource management, and struggles over resources and livelihoods. 
Even though PE lacks a coherent theory, it does encompass a solid set of critical concepts, 
methods, and theories from which to explain problems (Robbins, 2004). This approach is based 
on the intersection of ideas from fields including cultural ecology, ecological anthropology, 
political economy, and peasant studies (Watts, 2009). As such, political ecologists see 
environmental challenges in social terms. They view the connection between the environment 
and society as mutually causal, interactive, and dialectical; i.e. the class-specific perception of 
challenges and solutions for resource management, or the ways in which the power of classes is 
affected by resource management.  
Political ecologists have facilitated critical understandings of policy efforts and political 
issues that relate to sustainability, global change, and neoliberal management of resources 
(Zimmerer, 2010). Particularly, PE has greatly advanced understanding of environmental 
governance. Numerous publications in environmental governance have used PE to critically 
analyze topics relating to social power, political economy of resources, politics, property, and the 
environment (Blaikie and Muldavin, 2004; Le Billon, 2008; Wolford, 2004).  
Political ecologists view institutions – i.e. resource rights, policies on resource extraction 
and conservation, or management practices and social norms - as the link between “socially 
differentiated communities and biologically differentiated environments” (Peet & Watts, 1996, p. 
25). More specifically, geographers seek to elucidate how these institutional arrangements shape 
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the ways in which nature and society relate to each other, and how this relationship facilitates 
environmental and social regulation within a regime of accumulation (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). 
For my assessment, I rely precisely on this understanding of the role of institutions, and of how 
political economy shapes the management of resources through different forms of access and 
control.  
In my analysis I use the PE approach for several reasons. On one hand, the perspective 
from which I analyze this case study borrows from PE’s theoretical understanding of resource 
management. I recognize the management of water in terms of how political economy 
determines the capacity to manage the resource: through forms of access, control, and 
exploitation and through the understanding that one person’s accumulation is another person’s 
degradation (Watts, 2009). On another hand, its analytical tools -multi-scalar analysis and the 
understanding of discursive formations and practices - allow for a solid examination of the 
different ways in which water governance in Parón and PL residents’ water vulnerability are 
interrelated.   
A multi-scalar analysis serves to elucidate the complications of water governance and the 
role played by politics in shaping institutions and structures of governance, and ultimately, in 
determining access to water. For instance, the transformation of the lake to a reservoir  (Carey, 
French, & O'Brien, 2012), or the emergence of a new water regime in Peru in 2009 are issues 
that were originally driven by global politics. Both have had a significant effect on the lake’s 
water management and have affected the ways in which local residents from Cruz de Mayo, 
Campiña, and Caráz access water.68 Using a multi-scalar lens uncovers how the space where 
many of the identified vulnerability drivers originate is not necessarily the same as the one where 
                         
68 In 2009, the Government of Peru approved a water resources management reform program that was designed to increase the 
‘efficiency’ of water use; and thus change its contemporary use. The IADB contributed to this program with a loan of $10 million 
dollars (IADB, 2009).  
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loss will be potentially suffered. This is the case especially for vulnerabilities generated by 
development processes. For instance, it was in Lima that the privatization of Cañón del Pato, and 
the use of Lake Parón’s waters for purely hydroelectrical purposes were decided.  
In addition to multi-scalar analysis, I use discourse analysis. As political ecologists do, I 
examine the ways in which realities are rooted in social and ecological conditions, and how these 
conditions are manifested in daily life (Peet & Watts, 1996). I use this analytical lens to uncover 
how the construction and meaning of knowledge shape policy and practice, and how these, in 
turn, affect the forms of access and control over resources (Leach & Mearns, 1996; Moore, 1996; 
Peet & Watts, 1996; Pulido, 1996). As I analyze the conflict in PL, I illuminate the role of 
politics in shaping the governance-vulnerability relationship. More specifically, I explore how 
political discourses that inform water management shape access to water and exposure to GLOF.  
Before delving into this analysis, I consider it necessary to review political ecology 
conversations on vulnerability and environmental governance. 
POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF VULNERABILITY 
 
In their effort to “understand the complex relations between nature and society” (Watts, 
2000, p. 257), political ecologists have long been engaging with the study of vulnerability, risks 
and hazards (Clark et al., 2000; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008; Wisner et al., 2004). Natural hazards 
research was one of the main precursors to PE. Considerations of hazards and vulnerability have 
been fundamental to PE since its nascent years. White (1945), in his study of flood management, 
challenged the then customary way of dealing with floods, arguing that heavy reliance on 
engineering to solve hazards fails to deal with the underlying human problem. With this 
assessment, he made a tremendous contribution to approaches of human-environment interaction 
(Robbins, 2004). Watts pioneered a different approach towards hazards theory (1983). In his 
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critique of hazards research and human ecology, he ‘denaturalizes’ hazards that were 
fundamentally social – such as famine.  With this piece, Watts becomes one of the first scholars 
to introduce politics to the assessment of vulnerability. With an equally influential contribution, 
Blaikie, in his 1985 Political Economy of Soil Erosion in developing Countries, drew a causal 
link between soil erosion and a regime of accumulation by elite class interests. With this and 
later works (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987) many concepts that are key for PE - including a cross 
scale chain of explanation, and the perspective of a broadly defined political economy – become 
used for the first time.   
Oliver-Smith argues that vulnerability is fundamentally a political ecological concept 
because it is the “conceptual nexus that links the relationship that people have with their 
environment to social forces and institutions and the cultural values that sustain and contest 
them” (2004b, p. 10). Many geographers have tracked the evolution of vulnerability tools and 
methods across the fields of resource management, social change, and climate change (Adger, 
2006; McLaughlin & Dietz, 2008; Oliver-Smith, 2004a; Ribot, 2009). There have been two 
salient traditions within vulnerability research: disasters research and research on entitlements 
(Adger, 2006; Cutter, 2006).  
As Ribot (2009) explains, the entitlements and livelihoods approach is characterized by 
identifying multiple causes for a single outcome. Research on entitlements was originally driven 
by the need to understand food insecurity (Adger, 2006). Using this approach scholars have 
conceptualized vulnerability as “the lack of sufficient means to protect or sustain oneself in the 
face of climate events where risk is shaped by society’s provision of food, productive assets, and 
social protection arrangements” (Adger, 2006, p. 270). They view risk as inherently social. The 
concept of vulnerability in itself represents a critique to the technocratic approach towards 
86 
 
 
disaster management because it emphasizes what makes communities dangerous. Populations are 
vulnerable because they are exposed to hazards but also because they experience marginality that 
drives them into a state of “permanent emergency” (Bankoff, et al. 2004, p. 30). Critics argue 
that this approach to vulnerability underplays the important role of both ecological and physical 
factors.   
In contrast to social constructivists, scholars using the risk-vulnerability framework have 
tried to integrate knowledge of physical science, social science, and engineering to explain 
linkages among their elements (Adger, 2006). Rather than looking for causes of a disaster, they 
are concerned with evaluating the impacts of a single climate event and predicting the damage 
caused by fluctuation from normal environmental conditions (Ribot, 2009). They view 
vulnerability as a “dose-response relation between an exogenous hazard to a system and its 
adverse effects” (Fussel & Klein, 2006, p. 305). 
In recent years, vulnerability theorists have worked to better connect the human and 
biophysical factors. For instance, Ribot (2009) uses a framework that links these two views and 
maps out the causes of vulnerability from each unit at risk - individual, group, household, 
community, and region - to outline a policy research agenda on climate change vulnerability.  
This model views the entire system as a single, integrated unit and accounts all biophysical and 
social factors as shaping the vulnerability of the unit being studied. I view both social and 
environmental causes as important parts of a single system, accordingly I borrow from this 
particular framework for my analysis.  
By placing social and ecological drivers under a single system, this model locates 
environmental stresses within a social framework - a fact that, as the author argues “strengthens 
environmental arguments by making it clear how important … the quality of natural resources is 
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to social wellbeing” (Ribot, 2009, p. 8). While I agree that nature is fundamental for the 
wellbeing of human kind, I do not see humans as ontologically distinct from nature, and disagree 
with the subjugation of nature, especially when it comes to risk-mitigation efforts.69 Similar to 
Cutter, I believe that “The ideology of conquering or taming nature … rather than living in 
harmony with it, was (and still is) the driving force in the production of the physical 
vulnerability” (2006, p. xxii). It is the technocratic approach that was used to address the 
problem in Parón in the late 1960s that has caused PL residents to be in an even more vulnerable 
situation today. After Lake Parón was surveyed and classified as an unstable moraine-walled 
lake, to mitigate this latent hazard, the government embarked on a project to lower the lake’s 
water level (Carey, French, & O'Brien, 2012). By building a drainage tunnel in Lake Parón, the 
risk of an outburst flood began being ‘controlled’ with the regulation of the lake’s water surface 
level. 
Vulnerability Framework 
Based on Cutter’s (2006) work, I understand vulnerability as the combination of the 
potential damage or loss of life from exposure to contingencies, the sensitivity of people, places, 
and ecosystems to the stress, and the capacity to recover from stress. As such, I view 
vulnerability as a dynamic process that “expresses changing social and economic conditions in 
relation to the nature of the hazard” (Lewis, 1999, p. 14) and that “is determined by a 
combination of a set of variables such as class, gender, age, ethnicity and disability” (Wisner, 
1993, p. 131-133).  
Recent debates in the vulnerability and adaptation literatures in geography emphasize the 
importance of recognizing how interactions between global environmental change and 
                         
69 Scholars have rightfully argued that flawed policies that address symptoms and not causes, are based on views of nature as 
subjugated to humans (Oliver-Smith, 2002). 
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globalization (1) facilitate domination and create “root causes of vulnerability” (Pelling, 2012; p. 
60); and (2) foster a dramatic change in contextual conditions that “affect exposure and 
responses to future global change processes” and thus create new patterns of vulnerability 
(Leichenko & O’Brien, 2008; p.32). In this analysis, while I acknowledge the importance of 
“wider social processes” (Pelling, 2011, p. 85) in producing multiple stressors, I place particular 
emphasis on the local dynamics, which are more “amenable to action within national and local 
political space” (Pelling, 2012, p. 59).  
In this analysis, I include social and environmental factors contributing to vulnerability. 
Since my objective is to identify the ways in which vulnerability and water governance affect 
each other in conflictive PL, I place emphasis on social drivers including the struggles for power 
behind the creation of a new water governance body, the emergence of ‘community politics’70 
(Peet & Watts, 1996, p. 25), and the lack of political and economic equity71 (Wilder, 2008). I 
also consider biophysical drivers, such as climate change, and especially the latent, but serious, 
risk of outburst flood.  It is precisely because of how these biophysical risks have been dealt with 
in the past - with the use of technology - that I conceptualize social and environmental drivers of 
vulnerability in PL as being under a ‘single system’ (Ribot, 2009, p. 8). Underlying my analysis 
is the understanding that the use of technology has allowed water management to be the link that 
connects environmental and social variables.72 While risks and vulnerability are, to a certain 
                         
70 In this study I understand the community ‘in terms of hegemonies’ (Peet & Watts, 1996, p. 26). As I mention in Chapter Three, 
soon after the lake was seized, locals’ opinions and forces were unified against the bigger enemies: the national government and 
Duke Energy. However, soon after the community faced the responsibilities of financing and making decisions in regards to the 
lake’s water management, they divided into sub-groups according to their interests, and leaders became less transparent in their 
decision-making process. 
71 In her analysis, Wilder (2008) recognizes two different types of equity, political and economic equity. Economic equity refers 
to resource access and affordability. Political equity, on the other hand, relates to institutional transparency and citizen 
participation in the process of design and implementation of resource policies. 
72 The analysis presented in this chapter is in conversation with, and largely rooted on, the technonatures literature (Escobar, 
1999; Giglioli & Swyngedouw, 2008; Haraway, 1991; Ioris, 2012; Loftus, 2006; Sultana, 2013; Swyngedouw, 1996). My 
assessment implicitly highlights the ways in which politics of nature shape nature-society relations and how these are 
increasingly “technologically mediated, produced, enacted, and contested” (White & Wilbert, 2009. p. 6). As such, I recognize 
the important role that non-humans, or in this case water technologies, play in determining different hydro-social relations; While 
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degree, being controlled by water management, it is also the management of water that has been 
tainted with Parón’s current political turmoil, and that determines the use and distribution of the 
resource. In other words, it is because of the construction of floodgates in Parón, and the 
consequential ability to manage the lake’s waters, that the water governance structure, and 
political stability in the area, can strongly shape the risk of outburst flood, but also that 
perceptions of risk and vulnerability related to the lake’s water can affect the governance 
arrangements. 
While acknowledging larger environmental and social processes inducing vulnerability to 
PL residents and water users (indirectly addressed in Chapter Two), I limit my analysis to the 
factors that are directly related to the conflict and the lake’s water management. In what follows 
of this chapter, I use the term water vulnerability to refer to the different vulnerability drivers 
that derive directly from Parón’s water management.  
 
 
WATER GOVERNANCE IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY  
 
Nature-Society scholars in geography have been increasingly interested in environmental 
governance (Zimmerer, 2010). Most commonly, scholars have used a political ecology approach 
to problematize the ways in which nature is being governed. In a review of environmental 
governance literature, Bridge and Perreault (2009) found that as a consequence of its increasing 
popularity, geographers have given the subject a number of disparate, and at times contradictory, 
meanings. I consider it necessary to elaborate the way I conceptualize environmental (water) 
governance.  
The term governance alludes to “the trend away from state-centric forms of social and 
                                                                               
I acknowledge the tremendous importance of this body of literature, given the central arguments to be made in this chapter, I 
consider a comprehensive review of it beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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economic regulation” (Himley, 2008, p. 434), and highlights the growing influence of non-state 
actors. Environmental governance explains important changes in the spatial, administrative, and 
political relations of governing nature, and brings to light how such modes of governance 
produce new ‘socionatural arrangements’ (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012, p. 121). The understanding 
of environmental governance from which I base my analysis borrows from two different political 
ecology approaches to environmental governance: governance as problematic of state re-
regulation and as political participation (Bridge & Perreault, 2009).  
The view of environmental governance (and water governance) as a form of state re-
regulation is based on the understanding that participation of multiple non-state actors in 
governing processes shapes the use, control, management and regulation of nature to ultimately 
reinforce a given regime of accumulation (Bakker, 2003; Budds, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2007). As 
posited by Bakker (2003), the orientation of environmental governance towards market-based 
approaches was made possible by changing the social relations, material practices, and discursive 
representations of the environment. In the case of Peru, the new legal and institutional water 
governance framework requires a more formal relationship between state organizations and local 
water user groups (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). Since this framework is built on the basis of an 
economistic representation of water, and because campesino water systems are based on a 
fundamentally different representation of water, its implementation on highland areas is proving 
to be challenging73 (Lynch, 2012). In the case of the PL watershed these difficulties are many. 
For instance, an important point of disagreement between stakeholders is the formation of a 
Consejo de Cuenca, or river basin council.74 Government representatives from ANA and ALA, 
continue attempting to reinforce a regime of accumulation to the watershed by pushing for the 
                         
73 For more information on different perceptions of water in Peru, see Gelles, 2000 and Tradwick, 2003. 
74 The new Water Resources Law, by shifting the institutional framework from a centralized approach to an integrated 
framework at the watershed level, envisioned the creation of the Consejos de Cuenca to make significant decisions such as the 
planning, coordination and agreement of the use of water (Autoridad Nacional del Agua, 2009b). 
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inclusion of Duke Energy into the council. Representatives from the local government and local 
irrigators, however, refuse to accept this proposition to defend their future access to water. The 
opposing views and understandings of water, have left negotiators struggling to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution.  
The understanding of environmental governance as a form of political participation is 
based on the analysis of the changes in the ways in which social actors change relate to each 
other. This particular view brings to light the politics behind this transition to then evaluate how 
politically equitable are these changes. As Bridge and Perreault rightly explain, the move from 
government to governance is changing the relationships “via the language and models of 
partnership, participatory development, and stakeholder participation... [Subverting] old 
administrative, governmental hierarchies of ruler and ruled… and suggest[ing] an equality of 
agency among political actors” (2009, p. 482). In this regard, critical geographers have paid close 
attention to ‘transition management’ to emphasize stakeholder participation as a political process  
(Shove & Walker, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2007). They question who participates and who does not, 
whose voice gets heard, and ultimately who can be recognized as having political agency (Bridge 
& Perreault, 2009). Scholars studying the governance of water have emphasized the ways in 
which stakeholder power relations have proven a determinant factor in shaping governance 
institutions, structures and processes– including integrated water resources management (Cohen 
& Davidson, 2011) water privatization (Bakker, 2003; Budds, 2004), water technologies  (Carey, 
French, & O'Brien, 2012; Jasanoff, 2003), social struggles (Perreault, 2005).  
Before moving to the next section, in which I explore the ways in which water 
governance, water management, and water vulnerability interact with each other, it is important 
to highlight the distinction between water management and water governance. I understand water 
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governance as a concept that concerns organizational structures, institutional arrangements, and 
decision-making processes. Most importantly, I recognize the configuration of water governance 
as an inherently political process; a process that by giving increasing participation and influence 
to non-state actors, facilitates use, distribution, and regulation regimes that favor market-based 
interests and practices. Water management, in contrast, refers to one of the many ways in which 
water governance becomes materialized. It is the activity of planning, developing, and 
distributing the resource for its use.  
A WATER GOVERNANCE AND VULNERABILITY NEXUS IN A CONFLICTIVE ENVIRONMENT  
As explained above, this analysis is based on the understanding of water governance and 
vulnerability as co-produced. I recognize this two-way relationship as enabled through the 
construction of the drainage tunnel and the installation of floodgates in lake Parón. Additionally, 
I view water management as a key component of this relationship: I understand water 
management as the material expression of this relation. The lake’s water is managed not only for 
downstream water use, but also for risk mitigation. Hence, through water management, the 
effects of the politics behind PL’s water governance on the resident’s vulnerability are 
manifested. Similarly, the effects of perceptions of PL resident’s vulnerability on governance 
discussions become materialized through water management.   
Borrowing from Budds and Hinojosa’s framework of analysis (2012), I recognize the 
relationship between water governance and vulnerability in the PL watershed as embodied in, 
and expressed by, a range of ‘moments’ (or instances) that have affected, or have been affected 
by, the ways in which water is being managed. I explore these ‘moments’: water flows and 
management, institutions, discourses, and - given the particularities of Parón - negotiations. 
WATER FLOWS AND MANAGEMENT 
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The flow of water (its cycles and volumes) running from lake Parón downstream has 
varied significantly in the past few decades.75 In this section, I will illuminate how these 
variations have been partially determined by the politics behind the conflict and the 
consequential transformations of the lake’s water governance body, while shaping vulnerability 
fluctuations of PL water users and residents.76  
Residents living near Lake Parón have long faced a serious risk of outburst flood.77 
Before the drainage tunnel was constructed in the late 1960s, the lake’s water release mechanism 
consisted of infiltration through the moraine, causing it to be unstable (Personal communication, 
engineer and former employee of Duke Energy, June 10, 2010). Even though the flow of water 
was limited in comparison to what it is today, according to interviews, it provided sufficient 
water for the majority of all user groups.78 Hence, during this time, before anyone could control 
the lake’s water flow, the extent to which locals were vulnerable was driven by their risk of 
exposure to GLOF. To a lesser extent the vulnerability of irrigators was determined by location. 
Vulnerability is not experienced uniformly throughout PL watershed. In this case, location plays 
a key role in shaping differential vulnerability throughout the watershed. While those users 
located further from the stream have a less secure access to water, those who live near the flood 
path areas experience a heightened risk of disaster exposure.79 
The introduction of technology changed PL’s landscape of vulnerability drastically. 
                         
75  For specific information on flow variations refer to Chapter Three. 
76 By changing vulnerability, I do not necessarily imply that vulnerability as a whole increased or decreased, but rather that the 
driving factors and the intensity with which they contribute to PL resident vulnerability have shifted.    
77 Scientists identified a risk of outburst flood in the area as far back as 1940 (Carey, French, & O'Brien, 2012). For more details 
on this topic refer to Chapter One. 
78 Back then, and even today - that there is abundant water available – due to the distribution system and infrastructure, those 
water users who are at the end of the canal do not enjoy a secure access to water, as they are either obliged to irrigate at night 
time, when no one else is using the water, or simply do not access water (Personal communication, irrigator and community 
leader, August 11, 2011).  
79 The main determinants for water distribution among irrigators in PL are location and land area. The water flowing from the 
Parón-Llullán stream is distributed into several canals (some of which are paved). Sometimes these canals extend for over a 
kilometer and provide water to over 1,000 irrigators. Those who are closer to the main stream have access to the water first 
letting their downstream neighbors access the water after they are finished. The duration of time at which they are allowed to re-
direct the water flow to their property depends on the planted acreage.   
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Being able to control the lake’s water flows allowed the government to mitigate the long-existent 
latent risk of outburst flood. However, once the government began combining its disaster 
prevention agenda with interests of hydroelectric generation (Carey, 2008), PL irrigators were 
bound to become vulnerable through the politicization of their water source. Interviews suggest 
that this disaster management approach did not become much of a problem until the 1990s, when 
a series of privatizations drastically changed the country’s environmental governance. In 1996, 
when the government privatized downstream hydroelectric Cañón del Pato, control over lake 
Parón’s drainage system moved to private hands.80 This governance change appeared beneficial 
for watershed’s residents at first sight. The company would be better able to operate, maintain 
and repair the lake’s drainage infrastructure. In addition, their water use did not contradict the 
already-established safety requirements. However, the introduction of this new stakeholder 
proved disastrous to the local water user groups. While this new arrangement stabilized 
environmental factors driving water vulnerability, the social aspects were significantly 
aggravated.  
Water flow’s cycles changed drastically, and local user groups lacked a voice and access 
to information regarding the rate and timing for these changes. Since their water use was 
opposite to the company’s, these changes in water flow made their access to water vulnerable.81 
According to locals, while most often the company set flow rates too low – making it difficult to 
sustain crops - occasionally they released too much water, causing erosion, ruining the irrigation 
canals, flooding the fields, and damaging the quality of drinking water. The variability of the 
volume flow rate and the unpredictability of timing with at which its volume would change 
rendered water users and their lifeway vulnerable. It was particularly the lack of reliable access 
                         
80 For more details refer to Chapter Three.  
81  See page 51 to revisit the contradictions between the company’s and the community’s water use. 
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to water that had more serious effect on local populations since, for the most part, their 
livelihoods are intimately tied to their use and access to water.82 
For almost ten years, water flows reflected only the needs of Duke Energy, making local 
residents and user groups vulnerable in an almost unchanging way. The inability to control, or to 
have a voice as to the water flow, which translated into a lack of secure access to water, 
prevailed as the major factor influencing vulnerability throughout the PL watershed. Once again, 
in July 2008, the landscape of vulnerability changed drastically along with the management of 
water. Tired of being institutionally silenced and of resisting water discharges that damaged their 
livelihoods, locals organized themselves, took the lake by force, and since then have managed 
the water and controlled its flow according to their own needs.83 Interestingly, ever since they 
started managing the lake’s water, those in charge have paid especial attention to water flow                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
rates, ensuring that not a single drop of lake Parón’s water is used by Duke Energy;84 in a way, 
using water flow as a tool to make the company’s access to water vulnerable, and to show that it 
is the community who has the power now.   
This new governance arrangement caused significant changes in the vulnerability 
landscape because Parón’s water was now managed very differently. The new water 
management plan secured a distribution system and flow rate that not only protected the 
                         
82 The effects of an unreliable access to water are felt differently by all user groups. While Duke’s water management regime 
rendered residents of Caráz vulnerable by affecting the quality of potable water, the effects of the company’s water use were 
more severe for Campiña and Cruz de Mayo. Almost all Campiña residents rely heavily on water for their livelihoods as they live 
from agriculture, thus the then newly implemented water governance arrangement had a serious effect on their livelihoods, 
forcing many of them to migrate to Caráz in search for a new livelihood source (Personal communication, local farmer,  June 14, 
2010). Overall, however, Cruz de Mayo was the most affected by Duke’s water management regime, not only was their 
livelihood source endangered for the same reasons as Campiña, but also as their community is located in such a remote area, and 
as they have poor access to education, it is practically impossible to diversify their livelihood strategies.  
83 According to community leaders, it is through a joint effort that different user groups are managing the lake. While - given the 
remoteness and rough living conditions nearby the lake - they have always relied on someone from Cruz de Mayo to operate the 
infrastructure, decisions regarding how much water to release and when to do it are made by representatives from the different 
user groups. 
84 Glaciología - the one government agency that is still in good terms with the community – in their aim to ensure a safe 
management of water, has taught representatives from local irrigator groups how to measure the lake’s water surface level, and 
its stream’s volumetric flow rates. Since there are two streams of water flowing from the glaciers to the Santa River - being Lake 
Parón the head source of one of them – representatives ensure that the water flow entering the Santa river is no higher than the 
second stream’s flow (field notes, 2011).  
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community’s access to water, but also increased the risk of an outburst flood because those who 
control the lake’s water were only concerned with water use and distribution. The immediate 
need to secure the community’s access to water, and to demonstrate their power (over the 
government and the hydroelectric company) appeared to have eclipsed concerns over preventing 
an outburst flood. The volume of water flowing from the lake was significantly reduced, and 
safety standards could no longer be met. The more time went by, the more the lake’s water level 
rose, and the more unstable the moraine became. Despite repeated warnings from the 
government, community members and leaders refused to change their management scheme. 
After all, it was through government concerns over security and risk mitigation that their access 
to water and their voice as users were taken away in the first place. Only after numerous 
negotiations did community leaders agree to let a few, selected, government representatives 
collaborate with them on developing a safe water management scheme. Even though they jointly 
decided for how long, and when to release a higher, or lower, flow rate, the final word rested 
with the community.  
Ever since this collaboration between the government and local user groups began, 
fluctuations in the landscape of vulnerability have been closely tied to conflict negotiations. The 
extent to which the government-community collaboration is successful depends on the 
precarious relationship between the water authority and the community. The water flow has 
become more politicized than ever before. While it appears that to community users water flow 
has become a tool to demonstrate power, it seems like to the government it represents the only 
way through which the risk of GLOF could be mitigated. The extent to which the community’s 
water vulnerability is driven by the risk of GLOF or access to water depends directly on the 
water flow, and this flow in turn depends on the interests of those who are in control.   
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TECHNOLOGY 
After experiencing a few disastrous outburst floods in the Cordillera Blanca during the 
1950’s,85 experts rushed to survey and classify the lakes in the area (Carey, French, & O'Brien, 
2012). Pressured by the public and in the midst of a heated debate over the actual existence of a 
risk, the government embarked on ‘lake security projects’ that consisted of damming and 
partially draining the region’s most unstable lakes (Carey, 2010). As the largest lake in the 
Cordillera Blanca, and one that had been qualified in the past as a provoking a “situation of 
incessant danger” (Carey, 2010, p. 89), Parón was one of the lakes where the project was 
implemented and where technology was applied to mitigate the imminent risk of GLOF.  
As previously stated, with the introduction of hydroelectric technology to the lake, a 
direct link between lake Parón’s social and natural water dynamics was created. The drainage 
tunnel and floodgates enabled a strong connection between water governance and water 
vulnerability. In what follows of this section, I will elaborate on the nature of this two-way 
relationship and on the role of technology in mediating it. First, I explore the effects of water 
vulnerability on water governance, especially focusing on the key role that perception plays in 
shaping this relationship. Second, I study the ways in which water governance affects water 
vulnerability, emphasizing the role of politics in shaping vulnerability transformations.   
Water Vulnerability affecting Water Governance 
After the constant occurrence of glacier disasters in 1941, residents developed deep 
knowledge of Cordillera Blanca natural hazards  (Carey, 2008). As societal anxiety developed 
and grew with repeated natural disasters, people began to demand that the central government 
protect them from GLOFs. Even local authorities pleaded with the national government to be 
                         
85 In 1942, neighboring glacial Lake Palcacocha provoked a GLOF that took almost 5,000 lives in nearby Huaráz. In 1945 and 
1950, two additional outburst floods killed 700 people and almost destroyed downstream Cañón del Pato. 
98 
 
 
more aggressive in protecting their communities from glacial lake disasters. In 1942, municipal 
leaders from Caráz demanded disaster mitigation work at Lake Parón (Carey,2008). In 1951, 
engineers determined that the lake’s sudden swelling was caused by a flood at Artesoncocha, a 
lake three kilometers above Parón. Downstream populations were at the brink of disaster, which 
compelled 300 Caráz residents, accompanied by the local authorities and the local priest to hike 
30 kilometers to Lake Parón to take the patron saint of Caráz  to the lake’s shore and pray for the 
community’s population (Carey, 2008). After repeated public demands disaster mitigation 
technology was introduced to lake Parón in 1968 (Carey, French, & O'Brien, 2012). It was not 
until 1985 that its construction was finalized, and the lake’s threat of a GLOF was reduced when 
the government took charge of the lake’s water management and lowered the lake by 45 meters  
(Carey, French, & O'Brien, 2012).  
As time passed, the lake’s drainage technology began being used to prevent disasters and 
to support hydroelectric generation. As a result, locals found themselves being unable to satisfy 
urgent needs – such as having a reliable access to water. According to the government and 
hydroelectric company, Parón’s waters were being managed to prevent disasters and allocate 
water among users; to local irrigators the lake’s management took away their access to a critical 
resource. Fieldwork suggests that during this time, the local perception of PL’s water 
vulnerability changed considerably. While they still acknowledged the presence of the risk of 
glacial disasters, locals began perceiving that their ‘vulnerability to GLOFs’ was being used as a 
tool to take away their water rights.  
Driven by their conviction to defend their water rights, and ignoring the disaster 
management implications of their actions, locals seized the lake and created a transitional 
governance body.  Once in power, representatives assured local access to water. However, since 
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they acknowledged that addressing Lake Parón’s disaster prevention issues required more 
resources than they had available, they requested the formation of a multi-stakeholder 
governance body  (Untiveros, 2010). Unfortunately the stakeholders could not arrive at a 
consensus during negotiations and this governance body is yet to be created. Interviews suggest 
that this new governance arrangement will only be realized if locals perceive that it will secure 
their interests and reduce their water vulnerability. 
New Vulnerability Landscape 
While technology decreased the risk of glacial disasters, it also introduced a whole new 
set of factors driving social vulnerability that would prove to be central in shaping ongoing water 
vulnerability. First, the sole presence of technology in the watershed instantly created unequal 
power relations among stakeholders. Similar other geographers, I recognize the power that the 
water infrastructure has over the life of the watershed’s residents (Giglioli & Swyngedouw, 
2008; Loftus, 2006; Mehta, 2007; Sultana, 2013). By generating a sharp division between those 
stakeholders who are able to control the infrastructure and those who are not, the use of 
technology generated a socially unequal environment. Only a few stakeholders were able to 
operate the infrastructure, and with this regulate the day to day activities of other water user 
groups. Second, as a consequence of these unequal power relations among water user groups in 
the watershed, and given their disparate needs and uses of the resource, the struggle to control 
the resource rose to the surface.  
By default, the responsibility to control the lake was initially assumed by the government.  
Taking into account the needs of downstream water users, government experts released water to 
meet the established security requirements. Although during this time, local users still had secure 
access to the resource, their water vulnerability was mainly driven by how the system under 
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which they lived disconnected them from the water flow. With this governance arrangement, 
they did not have a voice in the decision-making process, and had limited access to information 
regarding how and why decisions were made.     
In 1996, when the government privatized the downstream hydroelectric plant Cañón del 
Pato, control over lake Parón’s drainage system moved to private hands.86 This private entity 
was a promising new actor because it had the expertise and capital to use and maintain the 
infrastructure. However, this transaction made evident that the lake’s water management was 
now directed towards reinforcing a regime of accumulation, a regime that proved disastrous to 
other stakeholder groups. By allowing this new actor to hold such power, and by not considering 
other stakeholders, the new governance arrangement completely destabilized the local water 
politics.  
While this new governance arrangement maintained the environmental drivers of water 
vulnerability under control, social drivers were significantly aggravated. Local water users were 
rendered vulnerable because they were systematically silenced and had no access to information 
regarding the rate and timing for volume flow changes. When information was made available, it 
was provided with insufficient time in advance to be prepared; As a result, because their water 
use – the timing, duration, and quantity of water flow variation required - was significantly 
different from the company’s, their access to water, and their livelihoods, were adversely 
affected.  
After the Lake was seized in 2008, and locals began controlling the lake’s water, the proper 
use and maintenance of the drainage technology became a concern for the security of all nearby 
residents. As mentioned earlier, the introduction of technology created a sharp division between 
those users who are able to safely manage and maintain the infrastructure, and those who are not. 
                         
86 For more details refer to Chapter Three.  
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Because it was the latter group who seized the lake and took over the responsibility of 
controlling the infrastructure, authorities in Huaráz and Lima were quick to bring up the risk 
implications of this new struggled-over governance arrangement. The lack of expertise and 
capital for the infrastructure’s maintenance were the main causes of concern.  
Once negotiations began, risk concerns came to the fore. Negotiating parties realized the 
immediate need to have a trained person operating the infrastructure, and more importantly, the 
urgency to come up with the funds necessary to pay for infrastructure maintenance. This problem 
was clearly explained during a conversation I held with a Caráz engineer: 
“[Water] users are disoriented; they don’t have access to training for managing lake Parón. 
They need to learn about the lake’s operation … [for this] one needs to know how the 
mechanics and electrical system [of the infrastructure] work, and even the natural processes 
of de-glaciation and rainfall. Taking into account all of these parameters is that one needs to 
operate the floodgates… Training is necessary, and it’s not being done! ... Those who are 
managing the lake’s waters have not been trained. They have only seen how the State’s 
operator uses the machinery, what buttons he’s pushing and when, but they don’t know 
anything about electrical circuits, how the pressure pumps or floodgates work!” (Personal 
communication, engineer and former Duke Energy employee, June 10, 2010)  
Even though these issues were repeatedly discussed in the negotiation process, given that the 
conflict’s outcome had placed the lake’s water governance in such a precarious situation, none of 
these issues could be addressed properly. On one hand, Glaciología agreed to conduct training 
and supervise operators; however, given the seclusion and harsh living conditions in the lake’s 
security post, it was always someone from Cruz de Mayo who was assigned this responsibility. 
As indicated in the previous quotation, these responsibilities require deep mechanical and 
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electrical knowledge about the machinery. It is unlikely that the lake’s operator will have 
sufficient knowledge to prevent a disaster with only a few training sessions. On another hand, 
negotiators never found a solution to the lake drainage infrastructure’s maintenance problem. 
While local water user groups were divided as to their willingness to contribute financially 
towards this cause, the local government, ANA, and regional government, were unable to 
compromise and agree on who should contribute and how much (field notes, 2011). Based on the 
uniqueness of this water management conundrum, where the resource’s control mediates its use 
and mitigates risk, it was difficult to pinpoint the responsibilities of each entity. In the end, 
nothing was done about it. In a context where this is only one of many issues to be negotiated, 
and where negotiations are continuously interrupted by the precariousness of the negotiating 
parties’ relationships, it is unlikely that these problems will be addressed anytime soon.  
In light of these considerations, I argue that the introduction of technology created a new set 
of social relations that reinforced social vulnerability upon local water users (White & Wilbert, 
2009). Because of these relations, today, local user groups, protecting their water rights, find 
themselves facing responsibilities that they were unprepared for. Since this technology was 
designed for a very different type of user than the ones actually controlling it, its poor operation 
and maintenance once again changed the landscape of vulnerability, making the risk of GLOF 
the most important factor influencing water vulnerability in the watershed.  
The appearance of these social drivers to the vulnerability equation of Parón occurred not 
because of the introduction of technology per-se, but because of the close connection between 
water governance and vulnerability that the use of this technology generated. The lake’s water 
control opened up the possibility to be used as a tool to defend particular interests. Hence, ever 
since the construction of the drainage tunnel, the intensity with which the risk of GLOF affects 
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water vulnerability has become closely tied to the political stability of the local water 
governance.  
DISCOURSE 
The relationship between vulnerability and water governance in Peru and in PL is both 
material and discursive. Their discursive relationship can be appreciated in discussions at 
multiple scales of analysis. For instance, as explored in Chapter Two, international debates about 
vulnerability to climate change and water scarcity have shaped the formation and structure of 
water governance frameworks (i.e. de-centralized, participatory, and based on the watershed 
unit). The aim for (economically) effective uses of water has informed rules and regulations that 
have in turn created a new rationality for water management. Since this rationale is not in 
accordance with the Andean conceptualization of the value of water, it has prompted a clash of 
interests and discussions over water use throughout the Peruvian Andes (including Parón), 
placing Andean livelihoods - such as Cruz de Mayo and Campiña - in a vulnerable situation. 
At the watershed level in PL, the discursive relationship between water governance and 
vulnerability has been transforming with time. In the mid to late 1900s, policy approaches 
towards disaster management were guided by engineering advances and scientific understanding 
of glacial lake dynamics (Fernandez Concha, 1957). This purely technocratic understanding of 
disaster management in the country shaped PL residents’ views of how to prevent GLOF 
disasters. They believed that risk mitigation was accomplished by constructing a security dam 
that was controlled by an expert (Carey, 2008). Once the infrastructure was built, implicitly, the 
lake’s management brought up a question that lingered in the back of all downstream water 
users’ minds: what is the lake’s water management purpose? Shifting views and answers to this 
question have shaped the ongoing discursive relationship between water governance and 
vulnerability. According to interviews, during the early years after the security wall was built, 
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downstream residents largely agreed on the need to manage the lake’s water to prevent a disaster, 
and having ‘experts’ in the governance body. Once the dam was privatized and irrigator’s access 
to water was being adversely affected, stakeholders’ understandings of the lake’s management 
purpose began diverging. While some argued that the infrastructure’s use should be directed 
toward disaster prevention, others defended their purpose for agricultural development. Still 
others advocated for hydroelectric generation. Since then, stakeholders have continuously 
debated the lake’s management purpose (agriculture, hydroelectric generation, disaster 
mitigation, tourism development), and with this discussions the meaning given to the lake’s 
water continues to shift.  
These perceptions have material effects that influence the formation of governance 
arrangements. This was the case in 2011. The direction of the conflict’s discussions at the time 
indicated that agriculture and disaster mitigation were the main management purposes disputed. 
This debate generated spinoff discourses that then affected the formation of a governance body. 
For instance, the previously-discussed slogan prefiero morir de una avalancha que de sed, or “I 
would rather die from an avalanche than of thirst”, hints to how the lake’s management purpose 
towards risks prevention is likely perceived as contradictory to its management for securing 
agricultural needs. Since the community’s priority is to defend access to water, rather than 
mitigating the risk of GLOFs, this perception, I argue, has shaped negotiations, hindering the 
formation of a new governance body.    
INSTITUTIONS 
Parón represents a unique case that, in a way, lies outside the issues covered by the 
legislation. Even though the regulation of the Water Resources Law, approved in 2010,87 
mandates the inclusion of risk mitigation actions in the watershed’s management plan, it fails to 
                         
87 DS No 001-2010-AG 
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provide many details that in the case of Parón are vital for the conflict negotiations to move 
forward.88 The lack of information regarding the financing of mitigation efforts, places PL in a 
tenuous situation. Since stakeholders are unable to secure the much needed financial support for 
the infrastructure’s operation and maintenance, it heightens PL residents’ vulnerability to glacial 
disasters. In fact, the problem becomes much more serious if Parón’s security dam is indeed 
categorized as a ‘hydraulic infrastructure’. According to the code’s section on operation of 
hydraulic infrastructure, users are responsible for the financial costs of operation and 
maintenance of the infrastructure.89 Since stakeholders repeatedly discussed this issue during the 
conflict negotiations, the users and state institutions are aware that this option is not viable. To 
this day, it remains to be seen how this specific aspect of the conflict’s negotiation will result. 
Fieldwork suggests that given this legal loophole (1) the government will likely avoid taking 
responsibility to maintain the infrastructure, and ultimately to secure PL’s resident’s safety; and 
(2) ANA will likely use the law to re-introduce Duke Energy to the governance body of Parón. 
Reinserting Duke into the watershed’s governance body would be a quick fix to this problem; 
however, the social consequences in PL would be catastrophic. 
The role that laws, rules, and regulations have played throughout the conflict is strongly 
influenced by the degree to which state agencies have unanimous positions. For example, the 
Constitutional Court (CC) and executive branch have not only contradicted, but challenged each 
other, affecting the credibility of the state, hampering the formation of a new governance body, 
and making water users more vulnerable. After Duke Energy requested that the CC evaluate the 
case and reinstate the company’s rights to lake Parón’s waters, the CC published a resolution that 
                         
88 The only reference to a water-related disaster mitigation effort is mentioned in Chapter Two, Article 264, of code No 29338, 
which assigns the responsibility to elaborate a plan to control and mitigate GLOFs is assigned to ANA and the regional 
representative of Civil Defense Institute (government institution in charge of disaster prevention). 
89 According to Title 4, Chapter Four, Article 187, of code No 29338, ‘the fee for the utilization of  large hydraulic infrastructure 
is the payment that water users ... make to cover the costs of services for operation and maintenance, and for the operator’s 
investment on building such infrastructure’ (author’s translation). 
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demanded the reinstatement of Duke’s water license. The resolution mandated that ANA evict 
the community from the lake, and that it return the lake’s infrastructure to Duke Energy.90 The 
impact of this resolution was so drastic not only because of the severe measures it imposed, but 
also because of when it was published. This resolution became public while local user groups, 
Caráz’ municipality, ANA, ALA, Glaciología, PNH, and the Regional Government were 
negotiating the formation of a new governance body, and more importantly, when Glaciología 
was beginning to succeed at gaining local trust by supervising the lake’s infrastructure 
management. As a result, by placing ANA – and consequentially ALA and Glaciología - in a 
position of confrontation with Parón’s water users, it caused all negotiations to freeze. In 
addition to excluding Glaciología from the lake’s management decision-making process, the 
resolution stopped all prospects of implementing the new water resources law, and creating a 
new governance body. Furthermore, it appears that the effect of this resolution has been opposite 
to its original intention. Rather than securing Egenor’s water rights, they have been rendered 
more vulnerable. According to interviews, neither the government nor Duke Energy will use 
force to enter the lake, and local user groups appear prepared to defend the lake against 
“whatever comes” (Personal communication, local government representative, August 11, 2011).  
The study of institutions in Parón, throughout the conflict, illuminates the ways in which 
politics mediate the relationship between water governance and vulnerability. Institutions are 
being used to secure the interest of some at the expense of others. The ambiguity in the 2009 
Water Resources Law is being used as a tool to (1) negotiate the re-entry of Duke Energy into 
the watershed’s governance body, and (2) free the government from having to face the financial 
costs that mitigating the risk of a glacial disaster implies. In addition, the analysis of institutions 
                         
90 This refers to resolution No 093-2007-AACH, which was created by the Autoridad Autónoma de Cuenca Hidrográfica del 
Santa, or Autonomous Authority of the Santa River Basin (a regional organization in charge of the use and conservation of water 
and soil in the Santa watershed that was dissolved in 2008). For more information see Chapter Three. 
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reveals how role of institutions affecting vulnerability is clearly shaped by the ways in which 
these are being used. In this case, the government’s inter-agency lack of communication, which 
sent contradictory messages, hampered peace efforts ultimately rendering both Duke Energy and 
the community more vulnerable.   
NEGOTIATIONS 
Water governance and vulnerability have changed according to proceedings of the 
conflict’s negotiation. Throughout this process, while some factors affecting vulnerability have 
become more important in influencing local water vulnerability, others have become less so. 
Negotiations have affected both the structure of the lake’s transitional governance body and the 
prospects of the formation of a new water governance arrangement. Scholars studying conflict 
resolution emphasize the importance of a negotiation process in determining the outcome of 
disputes (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2011). Aspects of Parón’s negotiation - who participates and who 
does not? Who facilitates and leads meetings? Where do they take place? Do the topics discussed 
represent all stakeholders’ concerns? Do negotiators really represent their people? are important 
for the outcome (in this case, a water governance body) and how it determines changes in the 
landscape of vulnerability.  
Conflict negotiations began taking place shortly after the lake was seized in 2008. 
Initially these negotiations occurred in Lima. At first they were oriented towards briefing high 
public officials about the conflict; afterwards the topics discussed shifted to the modification of 
the contemporary governance body and implementation of new arrangements (Untiveros, 2010). 
In fact, in a meeting in Lima just a few months after the lake was seized, Duke Energy proposed 
devolving the lake’s management to a mixed commission to be lead by INRENA, and with 
possible participation of the local user-groups (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009a). However, even 
though these included representatives from organizations such as the Ministry of Energy and 
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Mines, the Ministry of the Environment, congressmen from Ancash, and Duke Energy, they did 
not include local water users (Untiveros, 2010). Once again, a governance body was being 
negotiated and PL water users were excluded from the decision-making process.   
Even when negotiations moved to Caráz, took place at a relatively neutral location 
(Caráz’s Municipality), and began to include local water users, the meetings have always been 
under the responsibility of the government. It has always been the Water Authority that called for 
meetings and facilitated them. While according to interviews with negotiators, it appears that the 
topics discussed were of interest to all stakeholders; having the government lead discussions was 
problematic. As I was told during an interview “The users should be the ones directing the 
meetings and not the state. They should call for meetings, and think about the meeting’s agenda, 
rather than just accepting what’s being proposed to them. The users should direct meetings and 
have more responsibilities… the participatory aspect of the water law would work better if it had 
a social focus. Experts should yield responsibility to small farmers” (Personal communication, 
local public servant, August 2, 2011). 
As previously mentioned, addressing risk prevention has been a major concern for 
government agencies such as ANA and Glaciología; thus, the safe management of the lake’s 
waters was among the main topics of discussion. Particularly, negotiators arrived at a consensus 
regarding the appropriate water level for the lake and Glaciología’s role supervising its 
management.91 However, not all discussions around disaster prevention have been resolved. The 
maintenance of the lake’s infrastructure has been a very complex topic to address. It is of vital 
importance to reduce PL resident’s vulnerability to GLOF; however, given the way in which 
‘risk management’ has been used in the past to secure the interests of some, and how it is likely 
to be used to re-insert Duke Energy into the PL’s water governance body, it is unclear how the 
                         
91 For more on this particular negotiation refer to Chapter Three. 
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outcome of this discussion will affect the local water vulnerability.92 On the one hand, the 
vulnerability to GLOFs would unquestionably be reduced. On the other hand, the likely insertion 
of Duke Energy into the watershed’s governance body could (1) once again make the local 
access to water vulnerable, and (2) drive the local water users apart from the decision-making 
process and from information regarding the lake’s water management.   
CONCLUSION 
Parón is a unique case because of the specific context under which the conflict began and 
escalated. This conflict was driven by the struggle for access to the resource, and shaped by the 
politics of disaster management. This unique characteristic provides a rich case study to explore 
the ways in which water governance and vulnerability are interrelated. My ultimate goal was to 
uncover this link.  
Before examining this relationship, I introduced the intellectual approach I used for my 
analysis. I relied on political ecology because the critical concepts, methods, and theories from 
this tradition are suitable to uncover the complex relation involved. Subsequently, I provided a 
brief review of political ecology research on water governance and vulnerability. I used this 
review to then explain the way in which I conceptualize both terms. Finally, I examined the 
relationship between water governance and vulnerability. Specifically, I explained the effects of 
changing water governance bodies on the landscape of vulnerability, and how views and 
perceptions of vulnerability have affected the formation and change of governance arrangements.  
In particular, I illustrated this relationship by exploring specific ‘moments’ or instances that have 
affected PL before and throughout the conflict: water flows and management, technology, 
institutions, discourses, and negotiations.  
                         
92 For more information on how disaster mitigation is being used to re-introduce Duke Energy to the lake’s governance body 
refer to the institutions section.  
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By closely examining these ‘moments’, I was able to unpack the specific aspects of the 
governance-vulnerability relationship and to demonstrate the central role that water management 
plays in mediating this relationship. In my analysis, I understood water management as the 
fundamental connection between water governance and vulnerability. For instance, before it was 
possible to manage the lake, the local vulnerability to glacial disasters had been historically 
driven by the risk of GLOF. Ever since the lake was seized, the local water vulnerability - 
specifically driven by the risk of GLOF - has been either aggravated or diminished depending on 
the lake’s water surface level that resulted from a specific management regime.  
While management lies on the surface, buried underneath is the politics of water 
management. In an agitated political environment, such as PL became after the conflict erupted, 
water management has been driven by the local water politics. Hence, the effects of politics on 
the vulnerability-governance relationship have been tremendous. On one hand, overall, politics 
appears to have aggravated water vulnerability of all stakeholders. These effects vary largely by 
user group though. Aspects such as reliance on technology, discourses, and institutions seem to 
have benefited the interests of some at the expense of others. On the other hand, the formation of 
governance arrangements, as an inherently political process, has mediated the use, management, 
and regulation of the resource favoring particular interests and practices while rendering others 
vulnerable.  
The influential role of politics in shaping the relation between water governance and 
vulnerability would not be possible if technology had not been introduced to the watershed in the 
first place. It is precisely the introduction of this technology to PL that enabled such a direct link 
between water governance and vulnerability. By allowing a party to control the main water 
source in PL, it was also given the power to regulate the daily life of other water users (Loftus, 
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2006). Stakeholder vulnerability, in addition to being driven by the risk of a glacial disaster, 
began to be induced by social drivers. Since then, the social relations in the watershed have been 
profoundly changed, and since water users began struggling and competing for the resource, 
vulnerability has become becoming more dynamic than ever.  
Results from uncovering this relationship support critical views of technocratic 
approaches towards disaster management. The Parón case study shows how approaching 
disasters simply as physical phenomena, rather than mitigating risks, can exacerbate them. With 
the insertion of drainage technology to PL, vulnerability has become more dynamic, obscure, and 
unpredictable than ever before. The vulnerability of PL water users and residents’ has 
transformed to be driven by water governance decisions that are constantly changing. Also, since 
the politics behind the conflict caused the number of stakeholders affecting negotiations to 
increase, water management decisions have become unpredictable, and even secretive. 
Interviews indicate that Campiña irrigators were not kept well informed of negotiations, and that 
they were not even aware of how Parón’s water was being managed. With this in mind, it would 
be fair to argue that the vulnerability that PL water users experience has heightened because it 
has transformed to be multifaceted, more complicated, and unpredictable than it was before.  
The examination of the links between water governance and vulnerability also bring to 
light an important uncertainty regarding the role of the government in this conflict. As previously 
mentioned, once the lake’s infrastructure was privatized, it became unclear what the purpose of 
the lake’s water management was. While for some it was risk mitigation, for others it was 
hydroelectric generation, yet for others it was irrigation. This particular uncertainty is quite 
important because, it allows the government to deal with this governance issue by solely 
following the 2009 Water Resources Law. According to its legal code, the financial 
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responsibility for the water infrastructure should be borne by water users. However, the Parón 
case is unique. Ironically, while government agencies such as ANA and ALA are precisely the 
strongest advocates for managing Parón’s waters according to risk and vulnerability 
considerations, they also shy away from their role having to protect citizens from disasters. 
Further research must more fully explore and problematize the role of the government during this 
conflict. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WATER AND POLITICS: A CONCLUSION 
 
In July 2008 irrigators from the different communities in PL joined forces to recover their 
secure access to water and to defend their livelihoods. As a primarily agricultural area, the 
livelihoods of most community members at Campiña and Cruz de Mayo depend on having a 
reliable access to water (Lynch, 2012). Irrigators seized the lake after having to endure Duke 
Energy’s water management regime for over sixteen years. During this time, residents and 
irrigators in PL have been deprived of a reliable access to water. But the Parón water conflict has 
grown to represent more than a struggle for access to water. With this conflict it is both access to 
water and the production of vulnerability to disasters that are being negotiated.  
The water problem in Parón rose to the surface when Cañon del Pato hydroelectric plant 
moved to private hands; however, it began long before. The problem dates back to the time when 
the government began damming and draining lake Parón. It is precisely the possibility to control 
Parón’s water that initiated this conundrum. The damming of the lake, and addition of 
hydroelectric infrastructure to it, are key moments to this study because they introduced a new 
set of actors and interests to the watershed, and in doing so, presented this area with a new set of 
social relationships. Since then, water politics became a reality in day to day life in Parón, a 
reality that has been transforming ever since. Throughout time, the forms and intensity with 
which water politics have been manifested in Parón, have been evolving. Today, water politics in 
Parón is shaped by two main discourses: disaster management and access to water.  
In this thesis I explored the political environment of water in Parón. I analyzed the ways 
in which vulnerability to disasters and access to water have shaped conversations about water 
management. Even though I acknowledge water management as an important component of my 
analysis, I expand my assessment to encompass the broader dynamics that comprise the study of 
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water governance. I examined the ways in which organizational structures, institutional 
arrangements (2009 Water Resources Law), and decision-making processes (IWRM, 
decentralization) shape the access, use, management, and regulation of water in conflictive 
Parón. Furthermore, I reviewed water governance in relation to vulnerability. Specifically, I 
analyzed the ways in which water governance and vulnerability in Parón are interrelated. In what 
follows, I will review the arguments presented in this thesis. 
REVIEW 
In Chapter Two, I situate the reader in the environmental, historical, economic, and 
cultural settings of Peru. Particularly, I focus on the department of Ancash and the city of Caráz. 
For a better understanding of the Parón conflict, in addition to providing an empirical description 
of the contextual information, I had two main analytical objectives: to provide the reader with (a) 
sufficient information to understand Peru’s water conundrum, and (b) a clear idea of Andean 
Ancash’s landscape of vulnerability. For this, first, I have told the story of water stress in Peru. I 
introduced emerging water challenges such as climate change and the country’s disparate 
geographies of water use, to then critically analyze the government’s response to these threats. In 
particular, I focused on changes in the country’s legal and institutional framework for water 
governance. Second, I have mapped Ancash’s landscape of vulnerability. Through the 
introduction of the department’s social and environmental landscapes, I have shown the study 
area’s latent risk of exposure to natural disasters. Also I have provided a picture of resilience in 
Andean Ancash, by analyzing the access to social services and livelihood opportunities. 
With a clear picture of the context in which the conflict emerged, Chapter Three provided 
an overview of the Parón conflict. Even though this chapter is mainly empirical, while mapping 
the conflict’s progression, I elucidated the ways in which access to water is determined by 
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governance arrangements, and how these arrangements are in turn shaped by changing 
institutions, laws, and politics that benefit some users at the expense of others. I provided a 
detailed description of this conflict, to critically analyze, and illuminate the complications 
behind, environmental (water) governance. I demonstrated how water governance, as a process 
of political participation and inclusion, does not necessarily have implications for “justice, rights, 
and distribution” (Bridge & Perreault, 2009, p. 482). I showed how, by encouraging the 
participation of multiple non-state actors, water governance facilitates the negotiation of different 
representations of the environment (water management for stakeholder use vs. water 
management for risk mitigation), ultimately politicizing its management and reinforcing a regime 
of accumulation. In this assessment, it was also my intention to problematize the conflict’s 
negotiation process by pointing to transparency, leadership, and representation issues. The 
resource’s heavy politicization became a challenge that ultimately weakened institutional 
processes, inter-group communication, and parties’ negotiating room, making a mutually 
beneficial outcome more difficult. 
In addition to water distribution, the management of lake Parón’s waters is key for the 
mitigation of the risk of an outburst flood. Hence, with this conflict, it is both access to water and 
vulnerability to disasters that are being negotiated. In Chapter Four, I turned from critically 
analyzing water governance to examining how it relates to vulnerability. Conceptualizing this 
relationship as mutually causal, interactive, and dialectical, I explored how water regulation and 
management decisions channel the effects of water governance on vulnerability, but also how 
discursive conceptualizations of vulnerability shape the determination of governance structures. 
For this, I explored a range of moments or instances - water flows and management, technology, 
institutions, discourses, and negotiations – that I recognized as embodying this relationship. I 
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argued that a new, more convoluted, form of water politics – introduced to the watershed with 
hydropower technology – have created a new set of social relations that reinforce social 
vulnerability upon local water users, producing a transformation in vulnerability. Vulnerability, I 
argue, became more complicated, unpredictable, and multifaceted than ever before. Furthermore, 
recognizing institutions as being shaped by politics, I argued that their effect on vulnerability 
varies according to the user group. Similarly, as I viewed this relationship as material and 
discursive, I argued that discursive understandings of ‘the lake’s proper management’ have 
shaped the formation of governance bodies, in turn favoring the interests (and reducing the 
vulnerability) of some stakeholders at the expense of others.  
WATER GOVERNANCE AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE CONFLICT IN PARÓN 
Throughout this thesis I have discussed the complications behind water governance and 
the implementation of a governance framework. Furthermore, recognizing the configuration of a 
governance framework as an inherently political process, I acknowledged the ways in which they 
can have profound effects on broader aspects of water users lives. As such, I studied how water 
governance – the configuration of a governance body, the implementation of institutional 
arrangements, and the decision making processes and practices of given organizational structures 
– affects and is affected by vulnerability. Given the main findings in this thesis, I consider that 
important lessons can be drawn for both researchers and practitioners. In what follows of this 
chapter, first, I situate the main arguments in the literature and explain how they contribute to 
current debates. Second, I illustrate the importance of this thesis’ findings to practitioners for an 
improved management of future disagreements over water use and distribution.  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH IN GEOGRAPHY 
The main arguments presented in this thesis pertain to both water governance and 
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vulnerability literature in geography. While Chapter Three brings to light the complications 
behind decisions, processes and results of water governance, Chapter Four better elucidates 
vulnerability. By providing such a close examination of the conflict’s progression in Chapter 
Three, the arguments in this thesis support findings from previous studies on environmental (and 
water) governance in critical geography (Bakker, 2003; Bridge and Perreault, 2009; Budds, 
2004; Budds & Hinojosa, 2012; Himley, 2008; Loftus, 2006; Perreault, 2005). In Chapter Three, 
I explore the governance of water in Parón. Similarly to other geographers, I argue that the 
configuration of water governance frameworks is an inherently political process (Himley, 2008). 
First, much like other geographers, by critically analyzing recent changes in Peru’s legal and 
institutional water governance framework in Chapter Two, I elucidate how, to secure capital 
accumulation in the country, outside actors are re-framing discursive understandings of water as 
an economic good (Budds, 2004; Ioris, 2012; Loftus, 2006; Mehta, 2007). Second, by 
positioning the rescaling of water governance under neoliberalism and by examining decision 
making structures under the new legal framework, I contribute to previous findings that 
illuminate how decentralization and local participation do not necessarily result in local 
empowerment (Norman and Bakker, 2009). Third, in concurrence with Bridge and Perreault 
(2009), by closely examining the conflict negotiations and by analyzing each stakeholder, I 
illuminate how social relations (among state and private actors) shape environmental 
governance. Finally, in Chapter Four, by placing close attention to the effects of the introduction 
of drainage infrastructure and floodgates on the watershed’s social relations, similar to Loftus 
(2006; see also Mehta, 2007; Sultana, 2013), I recognized this technology as embodying social 
power and as a tool to impose a regime of accumulation. All in all, it could be argued that the 
contestation and struggle for water in Parón – the involvement of actors at multiple scales, the 
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clash of interests, the emergence of disparate discourses, the decision-making processes and 
spaces for negotiation, the uncertainties and even the injustices - is a perfect example of how the 
reconfiguration of governance structures, processes, and institutions looks like on the ground.  
While this thesis contributes to water governance discussions in geography, it also furthers the 
study of vulnerability in geography. 
 Even though the objective of my analysis was not to theorize vulnerability, I consider that 
my analysis reinforces previous debates on how to conceptualize the term. First, the vulnerability 
analysis I conducted in Chapter Four supports an integrative framework that links both 
entitlements and risk-hazard approaches. Much like other geographers, I have used this 
framework to trace vulnerability from a specific instance of risk (Blaikie, 1985; Ribot, 2009; 
Watts & Bohle, 1993). Particularly, I limited my analysis to “water vulnerability” – a term I used 
to refer to the analysis of the lake’s water management as an instance of risk. My analysis further 
validates the thoroughness of this model because it demonstrates how the use of “a multi-scale, 
multi-factor analysis of vulnerability” (Ribot, 2009, p. 6), elucidates the role and influence of 
multiple political forces.  
Second, in addition to supporting the importance of the integrative framework of 
analysis, this study borrows from and reinforces previous conceptualizations of vulnerability. 
Firstly, much like other geographers have already done, by elucidating the differential effects 
water management decisions throughout the watershed, this study understands that outcomes of 
single events vary according to social structure (Blaikie et al., 1994; Watts, 1987). Secondly, by 
examining how people (water user groups) move into and out of vulnerable situations throughout 
the conflict, this thesis reinforces the understanding of vulnerability as a dynamic concept. Being 
concerned with vulnerable situations, rather than with “simple taxonomies… of vulnerable 
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groups” (Wisner et al., 2004, p.15) allows for a better and more precise understanding of the 
process that induced such a situation. 
 As geographers have already done, findings in this thesis challenge technocratic 
approaches towards disaster management (Cutter, 2006; Wisner et al., 2004). As I argue on the 
concluding arguments of Chapter Four, previous Peruvian disaster management approaches that 
were too reliant on technology, rather than mitigating a disaster in PL ended up further 
exacerbated resident’s vulnerability. Similar to Loftus (2006; see also Carey, 2012; Mehta, 2007; 
Sultana, 2013) I problematized the use of technology illuminating the politics behind it. 
Recognizing that the struggle to control the water source in PL also affects the local water 
vulnerability, I argued that the introduction of drainage technology and floodgates have made 
vulnerability more dynamic, obscure, and unpredictable than ever before. 
PRACTITIONER CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Findings from this study provide important lessons especially regarding water 
governance efforts. The water conflict in Parón is only one of many water conflicts to come in 
Peru. As the country faces a very serious risks of water shortage, as supply and demand grow 
more geographically uneven, and as the government begins to implement a governance 
framework that appears inequitable, it is likely that conflicts of this nature will continue to 
increase in number. Cases such as Parón illuminate challenges to approaches currently taken to 
handle disagreements over water use and distribution, and to the implementation of the new 
water governance framework. The identification of these weaknesses could be of help to re-
direct these efforts as the government begins to face an increasing number of environmental 
conflicts, and continues to implement this new framework throughout the country.  
 In what follows of this section, setting aside scalar politics of water governance, I will 
120 
 
 
identify structural failures in the implementation efforts governance that hampered the conflict’s 
de-escalation, and that could potentially contribute to ignite or aggravate future water conflicts. 
Particularly, I focus my analysis to the participatory or IWRM aspect of the law. First, while 
IWRM principles in the 2009 Water Resources Law promise to improve participation and 
representation of marginalized populations, fieldwork indicates that excessive centralization and 
top-down decision making still persists. Assigning ANA (central government) the authority to 
create and design water related policies while giving the responsibility to implement and regulate 
to the regional and local authorities appears to be causing drawbacks because, as scholars have 
already argued, regional and local representatives remain disconnected from wider political-
economic processes (Oré et al., 2009). As a result, at least in Parón, it is still ANA who makes all 
decisions, which further discredits (1) ALA’s authority and (2) the decentralization process, in 
the eyes of the local population. Fieldwork indicates that if there is no trust especially in the 
decentralization process, it is likely that the creation of a functional ‘participatory’ governance 
framework will never be successful because local stakeholder involvement will decrease, and 
negotiations over a water management plan would hardly yield results.  
Second, while local representatives from the water authority now have the responsibility 
to implement and regulate the new water policy, fieldwork indicates that they do not have 
sufficient resources to match their responsibilities. In the case of Parón, this responsibility-
funding mismatch has further deteriorated the relationship between ANA and the water user 
groups. Being limited by time and resource pressures has forced ALA to ‘act fast’ and to almost 
force water users to abide by and familiarize themselves to the new legislation without providing 
proper training on it. Naturally, this combination of what could be seen as persuasiveness and 
secrecy was received by water user groups with suspicion. Locals interpreted this effort as a plot 
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to change their water uses, and to render their rights vulnerable. Given the historically 
contentious relationship between Andean campesino water users and the government, it is very 
likely that this story would repeat itself throughout the highlands, adversely affecting the 
possibility for a negotiation process and outcome that stakeholders could willingly accept.  
Third, a close analysis to the negotiation process in Parón elucidated a couple of 
problems that could also appear in future water conflicts in Peru. On one hand, negotiators did 
not always legitimately represent their constituencies.93 There appeared to be no mechanism in 
place to guarantee that all water users are adequately represented. While it could be argued that it 
is not the government’s responsibility to ensure adequate representation of negotiating parties, 
the case in Parón showed that it caused political instability, ultimately obstructing the 
negotiations. In addition, it is best to correct this representation issue to ensure that both the 
governance body and management plan it produces are long-lasting, received as legitimate, and 
respected.  
On another hand, the study of the negotiation process in Parón also illuminated the 
difficulty, and even impossibility, of arriving at any resolution because none of the negotiators 
appeared to have proper knowledge of how to negotiate. For instance, fieldwork indicated that all 
stakeholders approached the negotiation table with preconceived, and sometimes even opposing, 
outcomes. IWRM is based on principles of interest-based negotiation. According to researchers, 
for a negotiation process to yield outcomes that actually represent all stakeholders’ interests there 
are many requirements including: the need to plan and prepare for the process, the creation of 
negotiating rules, the consistency of meetings, the need for a common definition of the 
                         
93 In this analysis, I chose not to mention the lack of representation of all stakeholders in the negotiation process. Even though 
there were serious issues regarding the lack of representation of Duke Energy in the negotiation process, I consider them to be a 
unique characteristic of this conflict. In this case, it is still debated whether Duke Energy is a water user in PL or not because 
while the company’s infrastructure is in the watershed its use lies outside of the watershed. Hence, it is unlikely that a challenge 
like this will appear elsewhere in the future. 
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negotiation objectives and of what the process will do for them, and most of all, the need for all 
negotiators to be ready to compromise (Carpenter & Kennedy, 2001).   
These observations were made with the objective of ultimately redirecting water 
governance to become more equitable than it appears to be shaping to be thus far. Fieldwork 
indicates that, on the ground, the new governance framework is providing new spaces for locals 
to voice their opinions; however, these new spaces are failing to deliver more equitable results. 
Rather, these spaces are further aggravating local distrust and animosity against regulatory 
government agencies. This, however, is not to say that ‘more equitable’ results are unlikely with 
this new framework, but rather that these depend on how the implementation is undertaken.94 
The apparent inter-agency lack of communication, the local water authority’s lack of authority, 
sufficient funds and training has resulted in a disorderly implementation process that appears 
rushed, and that lacks mechanisms for transparency and accountability. It is important that 
critical research continues to be conducted in these areas because these deeper assessments that 
problematize development efforts better identify root causes for failures and provide guidance 
for practitioners to improve their practices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         
94 I emphasize ‘more equitable’ because I recognize that the extent to which this framework can become equitable is limited by 
politics and interests of powerful actors that lay outside this case study.  
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